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Written by Chris Dalby, Director of World of Crime
The Kingdom of the Netherlands seems perpetually locked in a rivalry with its neighbor. This neighbor is accused of being more corrupt, more violent, and full of drug trafficking.
Oh, no, this is not about Belgium. That would be too easy. This is about Venezuela.
The coastline of South America’s most corrupt country lies just 65 kilometers from the island of Curaçao, a constituent country within the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Drugs, migrants, gold, weapons, and contraband have flowed across this narrow strait, relying on the well-established criminal collusion within the government of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and security weaknesses in the Dutch Caribbean.
But the threats posed by Venezuela to the Netherlands have evolved. Venezuela’s largest gang, Tren de Aragua, saw its base of operations, the Tocorón prison, raided and its leadership scattered in 2023. But that has only multiplied the drug trafficking threat.
The islands also provide traffickers with a plethora of options. A rise in violence in small islands across the Caribbean can be correlated with an increase of cocaine trafficking through the likes of Turks and Caicos, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and St. Lucia. These countries are destinations along “island hopping” routes, where drugs are moved by go-fast boats through different islands where they are temporarily stored before moving on. Many of these routes begin their journey through Aruba and Curaçao.
Expansion of Venezuelan Gangs to Curaçao
Venezuela’s transnational criminal presence does not begin and end with Tren de Aragua. But it may seem that way. Since starting inside one of Venezuela’s main prisons, in the state of Aragua, the gang has expanded its criminal tentacles by following the flow of migrants leaving the beleaguered country. Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Peru have all felt the presence of the gang, bringing with it homicides, human trafficking, and sex trafficking.
Curaçao has not escaped this. Tren de Aragua has been connected to regular shipments of illegal migrants to Aruba and Curaçao. Millions of migrants have fled Venezuela over the last decade, but the small number fleeing to the Dutch islands has proven so profitable that Tren de Aragua is willing to fight to keep it. One route, from the town of La Vela de Coro in Venezuela to Curaçao, was dominated by a different gang until Tren de Aragua muscled in and took over, according to an investigation by Invisibles. These migrants are charged exorbitant fees, with the chance of reaching a destination so closely connected to a European nation being all the more attractive.
Policing this requires close cooperation between Dutch authorities as well as strong information-gathering in Venezuela, which is a tough task. Tren de Aragua may be the biggest name ferrying these migrants across, but they are not the only gang to do so. Plenty of small outfits operate across Venezuela’s Caribbean coast, often with the backing of local political elites, making it difficult to investigate and crack down on them.
Furthermore, in September 2023, thousands of Venezuelan police and soldiers raided Tren de Aragua’s base at Tocorón prison. This caused the group’s leadership to scatter, and there is little evidence they have regrouped in just one location.
Prisoners gathered during the raid at Tocorón prison. Source: Venezuelan Government
Instead of a top-down hierarchy, reports of smaller cells have emerged, indicating a more scattered operation. However, it remains a real threat. In July 2024, the United States labelled Tren de Aragua as a transnational criminal organization, and it is one of the principal criminal threats in Chile.
The Dutch Caribbean would be an obvious area for Tren de Aragua cells to maintain their presence. Beyond the easy money to be made from ferrying migrants, the existing Venezuelan diaspora, which makes up over 10% of the population of Curaçao, provides fertile ground to find new victims.
Vulnerabilities in Curaçao's Institutions and Defense
Curaçao's institutions and defense mechanisms are vulnerable to corruption and require ongoing vigilance. The Royal Netherlands Navy frequently deploys vessels to the Caribbean to monitor and counteract drug trafficking and other illicit activities. These have proven crucial to seizing drugs and following go-fast boats.
Seizures of cocaine by Dutch ships such as the Zr.Ms. Groningen are regularly among the most significant in the Caribbean and are an obvious way to show the Netherlands’ collaboration with American, British, French and Latin American partners. However, beyond the statistics, the impact of these patrols are limited.
Source: Koninklijke Marine
For example, periods of increased criminal activity have been observed during the absence of these patrols. When a ship is rotating out of the Dutch Caribbean area, and replacements can need several months to be in place, a noticeable increase in drug-related crimes and smuggling activities, showing how this prevention does not actually harm long-term criminal abilities.
And a March 2024 report stated that “the port of Curaçao is increasingly being chosen by international drug cartels as a starting point for shipping large quantities of cocaine to the Netherlands and other European destinations.” A major reason for this was that the Dutch Coast Guard had not had a patrol vessel assigned to the island for almost a year, allowing go-fast boats to operate with more impunity.
Corruption has also long been a challenge, with prosecutors seeking prison sentences of up to 15 years now for corrupt port personnel. There have been several reports of law enforcement officials colluding with drug traffickers. Beyond drugs, the handling of Venezuelan crude oil stored on Curaçao has also presented opportunities for graft.
Worse, the treatment of migrants has come in for sharp criticism. An April 2024 investigation by Dutch media, Pointer, found that Venezuelan migrants were abused, families were separated, and were not provided with legal protection. Instead of helping these migrants and sheltering them from criminal influence, this lack of support only enhances the chance they will fall into the clutches of Tren de Aragua or other Venezuelan gangs.
Phenomenon of Island Hopping
Island hopping has become a critical tactic for criminal organizations operating in the Caribbean, significantly impacting Dutch territories like Aruba, Bonaire, and Curaçao. This method involves using the geographic proximity of islands to Venezuela to facilitate the movement of drugs, arms, and human trafficking victims, making law enforcement efforts exceedingly challenging.
Criminals exploit the close distances between these islands, allowing them to quickly transfer illegal goods and evade detection. One longstanding tactic is for traffickers to use high-speed boats to move cocaine from Venezuela to the Dutch Caribbean islands, where the drugs are then further distributed to Europe and North America. These small, fast vessels can easily navigate the archipelago, making it difficult for authorities to intercept them. And when they do, the crews don’t hesitate to use violence.
On June 4, 2024, two Dutch craft responded to a go-fast boat near Curaçao, suspected of carrying cocaine. Three men on board opened fire on the Dutch soldiers who defended themselves and sunk the ship and alleged traffickers. The quantities on board can be eye-watering, with around one ton of cocaine found on one vessel in November 2023 and 1,600 kilograms dumped off another last July.
This is nothing new, the cat-and-mouse game between traffickers and Dutch law enforcement has lasted for years. But the additional complexity of island hopping complicates the state response.
While the Zr.Ms. Groningen and other naval assets are a major strength for the Netherlands, integrated surveillance, data-sharing and other forms of cooperation with smaller Caribbean nations are weak.
Crises to do with homicide, arms trafficking, and cybercrime in the region have triggered efforts to curb this lack of cooperation. The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) began a cybercrime initiative in 2022 and a “war on guns” in 2023. Much of CARICOM’s work in the criminal and security sphere is focused on the threat from Venezuela. However, the Netherlands-CARICOM collaboration is not yet fully exploited, since Curaçao only became an associate member in June 2024. It is the only Dutch Caribbean island to have this status.
There is much for the Netherlands to offer, including the use of radar systems and aerial drones to warn other nations of suspicious ships and planes. Additionally, fostering stronger legal frameworks and joint task forces among Caribbean nations can ensure swift action to disrupt these sophisticated networks and secure the region more effectively.
