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Written by Arianna Lucà, Jacob Dickinson, Mark Bruno, Kevin Heller, Sara Frisan
Russia-Ukraine: As Ukraine invades Russia, operationalizes F-16s and domestically develops weapons to hit targets within Russia, Moscow is advancing on Pokrovsk.
Israel: With the recovery of six hostages who were killed by Hamas, Netanyahu feels the pressure from inside and out to strike a deal with Hamas.
Myanmar: Arakan Army gains control of Rakhine State and resistance forces gain more territory as humanitarian crisis deepens.
Sudan: As Sudanese army boycotts U.S.-led peace talks, no end in sight to Sudan conflict.
Libya: The two main rivaling groups in Libya are both mobilizing forces and calling on militias to join their side in the run up to the October 2024 general elections.
Turkey: As Turkey continues to conduct lethal airstrikes in a cross-borders counter-terrorism campaign, it attempts to improve relations with Iraq and Syria.
Burkina Faso: Unprecedented deadly attack in Burkina Faso shows military junta's struggles to combat rampant extremist violence.
Indonesia: Proposed electoral law is canceled after thousands protests in Jakarta.
DRC: Ceasefire with M23 fails as fighting resumes in eastern DRC.
Venezuela: As the crackdown on protests continues, the Maduro government issues an arrest warrant for the opposition leader.
Haiti: As Haiti is rocked by gang violence, the slow progress of the MSS raises concerns about the effectiveness of the UN-backed mission.
China-Philippines: Coast guard vessel confrontation over another island in the South China Sea, the Sabina Shoal.
Conflicts, August 2024
Russia-Ukraine
In August 2024, the conflict between Russia and Ukraine saw a significant development, with Ukraine invading Russia. The surprise incursion into the Kursk region resulted in over 1200 km2 captured by the Ukrainian Armed Forces and hundreds if not thousands of Russian soldiers taken as POWs. Being Putin's latest 'red line' crossed, even this direct invasion of Russian soil has not triggered any of the escalation scenarios feared by the Western leaders. Ukraine publicly stated it has no long-term plans to keep Russian soil under its control; however, the defensive works put in place indicate it will not give it back without a fight. For now, Ukraine is still on the advance in the region, likely looking to take the Russian soldiers caught in the cut-off and surrounded area between Ukraine and the Seym River out of the fight.
On the other side of the spectrum and the conflict lies the Donetsk region, where the Russian Armed Forces have concentrated their offensive efforts. With their eyes set on Pokrovsk, the Russian Armed Forces are slowly but steadily making their way to the city. In a movement that worried many analysts about a potential breakthrough, fighting will likely arrive in Pokrovsk within the coming month. A town comparable in size to Bakhmut, the question is whether the world will see a repeat of the meat grinder that was Bakhmut. Russia took around six months to take that city, losing an exorbitant amount of manpower.
Airstrikes between the two nations are only escalating as the war continues, with Russia recently launching its biggest aerial attack since the start of the full-scale war. This attack also gave the recently arrived F-16s their official baptism of fire, as they were used to fend off the incoming attack. One F-16 was lost in this operation, which was claimed to have been an accident. Much about this is unclear for now, with claims from Ukraine that there was no case of pilot error.
As permission to engage targets with donated weapons inside Russia was not granted by (all) western countries, Ukraine sees more and more domestically developed long-range weapons on a regular basis. Their latest product is a new 'rocket drone' which is meant to attack Russian targets well beyond its borders. Being a multitude faster than any of the current drones Ukraine uses to attack Russia at the moment, the success rate of this new weapon is likely to be higher. The war continues with no clear future victor in sight. Weapon developments continue steadily, both to outdo their opponent or to fill gaps left by supporting countries.
Israel
The conflict between Israel and Hamas is still ongoing. Hamas and Israel have both agreed to return to the negotiation table to talk about a ceasefire in Gaza and to talk about the release of the Israeli hostages, of which 100 are still believed to be in the hands of Hamas. With the recovery of the bodies of six hostages who were killed by Hamas, the pressure on Netanyahu to reach a peace agreement with Hamas is growing. The United States, Europe, and the Arab countries all call on Netanyahu to reach a deal as soon as possible so the last hostages can be released. Meanwhile, Israeli citizens have taken to the streets to demand a hostage deal as quickly as possible. However, the right-wing parties and commanders in the IDF are convinced that Hamas is close to being completely defeated and are very reluctant to sit down for a peace agreement, as a peace deal could give Hamas time to replenish resources and recruit new troops. Israel has been conducting military operations in Gaza aimed at denying Hamas recuperation since August 2024 by destroying their weapon caches, tunnels, and several headquarters. Hamas has not been able to launch any significant attacks on Israel or Israeli forces, and the ceasefire negotiations are likely to be the only means for Hamas to be able to survive the coming months.
After the targeted assassinations of Hamas leader Haniyeh in Tehran and Hezbollah commander Shukr in Beirut on July 30, both Iran and Hezbollah have threatened to retaliate against Israel. On August 25, the Israeli Air Force sent 100 fighter jets into Lebanon to destroy over 1000 Hezbollah missile installations in a pre-emptive strike as intelligence showed Hezbollah was preparing to launch hundreds, if not thousands, of missiles, rockets and UAVs into Israel. In response to the pre-emptive strike, Hezbollah managed to launch over 400 missiles and UAVs into Israel, which were either intercepted by Israeli air defense systems or did minimal damage to the countryside. According to several United States intelligence services, Iran is still willing to strike at Israel, but it is unclear why there is a delay in the execution of the plan. The pressure put on Iran by the US is likely to be a significant factor. At the same time, Iran is undergoing an intensive audit of its security forces as it seems that valuable information has been leaked to Israeli intelligence services on the strengths of Iran’s weapons programs and the whereabouts of high-ranking Iranian, Palestinian, and Lebanese leaders and commanders.
The coming months will show whether or not any of the involved parties in the conflict are willing to agree to a ceasefire or that the conflict will continue and perhaps escalate even further. It is clear, however, that Israel will not easily submit to ceasefire negotiations now that it feels it is winning the war against Hamas and it has such a grip on the movements of Iran and Hezbollah. The pressure from the US on all parties is likely to keep the region from completely falling apart into a regional war, especially since most Arab states have shown reluctance to support Iran, Hezbollah, or Hamas recently and are making various forms of business treaties and agreements with Israel.
Myanmar
The Myanmar civil war is ongoing. The resistance groups against the military junta have taken wrested control from the military in Shan, Kayah, and the Kachin State. The Arakan Army (AA) has taken most of the central and northern parts of the Rakhine State, on the border with Bangladesh, and has taken numerous important cities previously held by the military. There are reports of widespread human rights abuses against Rohingya Muslims from the military junta’s forced conscription to the AA’s attacks on civilians. The intense fighting between AA forces and the military and airstrikes against civilian areas has led to a humanitarian crisis as hundreds of thousands flee. The UN said that the food aid being supplied to civilians has also been prevented from entering the state, with over 600,000 civilians at risk of starvation.
In mid-August the government announced that certain civilians will be allowed to carry weapons as the resistance forces approach the country’s second largest city, Mandalay. After the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) captured Lashio, a major military operations center in the northeastern Shan State, the military has been attempting to shore up further support from China. The TNLA’s seizure of a Chinese-owned nickel mine has threatened China’s economic interests and the ability of the military junta to control its interests in the country. The Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi met with the US, Thailand and the UN to discuss the issue at the same time as launching live-fire military exercises on the border with Myanmar.
The military junta’s loss of control in key areas as well as the ineffectiveness of deadly airstrikes has led to more delays in its proposed elections. The National Unity Government, the main opposition coordinating the resistance forces, has called the next elections as a sham. While the majority of the country as well as western governments will see the elections as illegitimate, for China and other regional actors, this is seen as an opening to some kind of political settlement. Yet the challenges faced by the military and the progress of the armed groups suggest that the civil war is likely to continue in the coming months.
Sudan
In August 2024, the US-brokered peace talks to resolve the ongoing Sudan conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF). were held in Geneva. However, neither of the warring parties showed up. Although the RSF delegation was present in Geneva, it boycotted the negotiations. Sudan's de facto governor, army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, decided not to attend the talks in Switzerland following RSF's continued armed and drone attacks in the country. The talks in Geneva proceeded despite the absence of the SAF delegation. While the negotiations did not result in a cessation of hostilities or steps toward ending the conflict, some progress was made regarding access to humanitarian aid. The warring parties agreed to reopen the Adre border crossing from Chad, which is connected to the Darfur region, and the Dabbah road from Port Sudan. Despite the non-attendance in Geneva, the SAF sent a delegation to Jeddah to meet with U.S. mediators in early August and announced its presence at a meeting in Cairo to discuss humanitarian assistance with the US and Egypt.
As peace talks stall, the humanitarian crisis in Sudan continues to worsen. According to a UN report released in early August, over half a million people in Sudan are living in famine and nearly 27 million are experiencing acute hunger. Moreover, armed violence and clashes between RSF and the army, as well as attacks targeting civilians persist in the country. On August 17, at least 85 people were killed in the central province of Sennar during a paramilitary attack on the village of Galgani. RSF attacks persist in North Darfur, an area recently affected by massive floods. At least 30 people were killed in early August during an attack on El Fasher, capital of North Darfur. In the last few weeks, extensive Sudanese army airstrikes have been reported in the region. On September 1, at least 10 people were killed and over 40 wounded in airstrikes in the city of Mellit in North Darfur.
Alerts, August 2024
Libya
On August 9, the UN mission in Libya, UNSMIL, warned of a possible new conflict in the already war-torn Libya. The country has been run by two rival governments since 2014. The Western government, the Government of National Accord, is supported by the UN and the EU. In contrast, the eastern government, called the Libyan National Army, receives support from various sources, including Iran, Russia, and some Arab and sub-saharan states.
The Libyan National Army, run by former warlord Khalifa Haftar, feels it has the right to run more of Libya and has been desperate to take control of strategically important cities. Haftar's forces, led by his son Saddam, have attacked Tripoli in 2019 in an attempt to take control of the entire country. The attack failed, and a peace deal was signed in 2020.
Since the end of July and the beginning of August 2024, Haftar has been mobilizing his forces again and has called for the help of other local tribes and clans to join his forces. In response, the Government of National Accord mobilized its forces and called on other clans and militias to strengthen its forces. The fragile peace in Libya has not been under this much pressure for years, and several observers and analysts fear that a renewed conflict is unavoidable. The recent arrival of a large merchant vessel in one of the Haftar-controlled harbors is believed to be under the authority of the Russian government. Some believe that Russia has just delivered a new set of weapons for Haftar in his bid to take control of Libya. The appointment of a new president of the National Bank on August 15 has not helped calm the situation down, as both parties feel the other is trying to gain control over the economy. In response, the Libyan National Army has shut down oil production in its areas of control. As an OPEC member this provision could affect the international price of crude oil. Oil workers in the harbors of Libya have said that they are continuing to fill oil tankers up and have not heard anything about the reported shutdown.
The coming weeks will prove whether or not Haftar is truly intent on gaining more control over cities, airports, and harbors. The reaction of the international community will determine whether or not such a move will turn into a full-blown war.
Turkey
This summer has seen a number of developments in the conflict between Turkey and the various Kurdish independence movements, broadly referred to as the Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK). Turkey considers all of the groups that fall under this umbrella as affiliated with the insurgent Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which is internationally recognized as a terrorist organization. Despite any differences in motivation, national origin, or objective, all of these groups are considered terrorists by Erdoğan’s government, and have been targeted in various military operations that have taken place not only in southern Turkey, but outside national borders in Iraq and Syria. The Turkish state has pushed this campaign as a broader anti-terrorism effort that it has contributed to against ISIS and other IS affiliates. Turkey’s mixed strategic priorities in the region have complicated its relationships with several allies. Particularly, Turkey has been at odds with the United States and Iraq, who support various parties within the KCK (though not the PKK). Developments in Turkish campaigns have gone largely underreported due to the unfolding regional conflict centered on Israel.
In attempts to improve relations with Iraq and the Assad regime in Syria, Turkey and Iraq have developed a new military cooperation pact. Part of this has included a promise to hand control of a Nineveh-province airbase back to Iraq’s Army. At the same time, the Syrian regime has declared that it will no longer demand that Turkish troops leave the country, as both governments discuss re-normalizing their relationship. It should be noted that both the Turkish and Syrian governments have fought various elements of the KCK, even as all three factions have been at war with ISIS. This could be indicative of further positioning of both militaries against the PYD/YPG, who are allied with the United States. As well, the normalization may be part of an attempt to re-home Syrian refugees staying in Turkey, who have recently faced increased persecution and political pressure since the beginning of the year.
Turkish airstrikes into Iraq have continued, with an August 23rd strike into Iraqi Kurdistan, controlled by other KCK affiliates, killing three people, and another on September 2nd, killing twenty. The second strike was claimed by the Turkish government as being against purely PKK targets with no civilian casualties. That same day, a former PKK operative and Turkish citizen was sentenced to four years and three months of prison in Germany on terrorism charges.
On September 3, two US marines were attacked by a group of fifteen assailants in the port city of Izmir. The attackers were members of the Turkish Youth Union, an extreme nationalist group. Both marines were returned to their unit uninjured and the assailants arrested.
Burkina Faso
On August 25, 2024, an unprecedented armed attack by the Jama'a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin group (JNIM), an Al Qaeda affiliate in West Africa, killed more than 200 people and injured at least a hundred. The strike occurred in the village of Barsalogho, located about 80 kilometers north of the capital, Ouagadougou, near the strategic town of Kaia. Despite Al Qaeda-linked JNIM's claim that the victims were militia affiliated with the Burkina Faso army, local sources report that most of the victims were instead civilians. Since 2015, Burkina Faso has suffered regular armed attacks by jihadist groups in a conflict that has claimed more than 20,000 lives. The military government, which lacks control over vast areas of the country, especially near the porous borders with Mali and Niger, has strengthened its partnership with the Russian government in recent months to secure support in the fight against extremist terrorist attacks.
In July 2024, the military juntas of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger created a confederation called the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), formalizing their exit from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and distancing themselves from Western partners. Although the new alliance promises to effectively combat extremist terror and militia attacks in the region, the rapid spread of violent extremist organizations, including the al-Qaeda-linked Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), is alarming. After the exit from the ECOWAS bloc and the withdrawal of all Western forces from the three countries, which are among the most affected by the Islamic groups' violence, international observers and ECOWAS leaders fear a spillover of jihadist groups into neighboring countries. Following the late August attack, the UN called on the Burkina Faso government to re-engage with the international community and the ECOWS to ensure security and obtain support in combating the rise of extremism in the region.
While extremist violence rages, Burkina Faso is experiencing a severe humanitarian crisis, with more than 6 million people in need of humanitarian assistance and food insecurity. The government is tightening its authoritarian grip on the population, increasingly restricting freedoms and rights in the name of "national security." The political isolation of the AES military juntas makes hopes for democratic government restoration in the region unrealistic.
Indonesia
People in Indonesia’s capital Jakarta have protested against a government attempt to reverse a ruling by Indonesia’s top court on August 22. This ruling determined that parties do not need a minimum of 20% of the vote in their regional assemblies as a prerequisite for fielding a candidate. While most of the protests in Jakarta remain peaceful, some protesters tried to breach the gates of the Indonesian House of Representatives. Police fired tear gas and water cannons. Protests also took place in the cities Yogyakarta, Bandung, Surabaya, and Makassar on August 23. These protests focussed on outgoing president Jokowi’s attempts to prolong his political influence through installing his sons to positions in Indonesia’s political system. Eventually, it was stated by the deputy speaker that the revision of the regional election law would not be implemented on August 22. It is unclear whether the government will try to implement the revisions again in the future, but worries in Indonesia about Jokowi's increase of political influence are growing. Jokowi changed the constitutional age limits to allow his son to run for vice president in the 2024 general elections. Tensions have risen after the protests on August 22 and August 23 and future political maneuvers by Jokowi and his government could lead to more protests in the near future.
Updates, August 2024
Democratic Republic of Congo
Despite signing an Angola-brokered ceasefire between the Congolese government and Rwanda, which came into effect on August 4, clashes in eastern DRC North Kivu intensified in late August 2024. Heavy fighting renewed between Congolese forces and the M23 rebel group near the densely populated areas of Lake Edward and Lake Kivu. It was reported that Rwanda-backed M23 had made a significant advance, taking control on August 25 of the eastern town of Kirumba. On August 28, M23 accused the Congolese army for the first time of violating the ceasefire, claiming that Kinshasa-backed rebels, such as the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) and Wazalendo militias, but also international forces, including those of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), were violating the ceasefire. The fragile ceasefire was also undermined by rising tensions between the DRC and Rwanda governments, which peaked after Rwanda President Kagame criticized Congolese President Tshisekedi on August 11 for failing to address the deteriorating security situation in the region. The DRC announced that it will sue Rwanda in the East African Court of Justice on September 26 over charges of violating its sovereignty, committing atrocities against civilians, and violating international law with its involvement in the conflict and support for the M23.
While the resumption of clashes threatens to worsen the humanitarian crisis in the country, the DRC is also facing the rapid spread of the Mpox epidemic. Although Mpox is endemic in 11 provinces in the DRC, the number of cases has been rising sharply over the past two years. Between January and August 2024, more than 16,000 suspected cases were reported in almost all 26 provinces. Displaced people and people affected by the conflict are particularly at risk. Humanitarian aid and vaccines are delayed.
Venezuela
Political and social unrest continues to grip Venezuela following the contested presidential election on July 28. On August 22, the Venezuelan Supreme Court (TSJ) confirmed President Maduro's victory, a ruling that is final and has sparked widespread condemnation both internationally and regionally. The TSJ also accused opposition candidate Edmundo González of attempted electoral fraud and inciting violence alongside opposition leader María Corina Machado. Both González and Machado went into hiding. However, Machado resurfaced on August 28 to join the latest protests against Maduro in Caracas. In a recent interview, she asserted that the opposition has a strong strategy, emphasizing that coordinated internal and external efforts, including peaceful protests and international pressure, still hold the potential to unseat President Maduro. On September 2, Venezuela's attorney general's office confirmed that a court had issued an arrest warrant for opposition leader Edmundo González, accusing him of conspiracy and other crimes against Maduro's government.
Since the election, anti-government protests have resulted in at least 23 deaths, nearly 200 injuries, and over 2,400 arrests. Amid the deepening crisis, the government has escalated its crackdown by imposing tighter restrictions on NGOs and forcing over 100 state employees at the state oil company PDVSA to resign for opposing Maduro. The Venezuelan military has pledged loyalty to Maduro, who has increasingly relied on security forces to maintain his hold on power. Diosdado Cabello, a hardline ruling party leader, has been appointed as interior minister with control over the police forces, raising fears of an intensified crackdown on dissent.
International pressure on the Maduro government persists. On September 2, the US seized Venezuela's presidential airplane in the Dominican Republic, allegedly purchased in violation of sanctions. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights urged Venezuelan authorities to end actions that instill terror in the population. However, the crisis shows no signs of abating, and further protests are expected as tensions continue to escalate.
Haiti
Anti-gang operations in Haiti are progressing slowly, two months after the arrival of the first Kenyan police forces. Currently, 400 Kenyan soldiers are deployed out of the 2,500 planned, and concerns are mounting over the effectiveness of the UN-backed Kenya-led Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission aimed at assisting Haitian police in restoring security. While the Kenyan forces have successfully reclaimed infrastructural sites in Port-au-Prince, including the airport and the largest hospital, challenges persist. In late July 2024, Kenyan troops conducted an operation in Ganthier, a town east of Port-au-Prince that had fallen under gang control. However, the operation saw limited success as gang members fled before the security forces arrived, only to retake the town after the Kenyan and Haitian police withdrew. Moreover, the MSS strategies are not clear, and there is limited involvement of Haitian police and authorities in the operations, undermining the credibility and effectiveness of the mission. Reports of inadequate equipment for the MSS forces have prompted the U.S. military to announce, on August 24, the delivery of additional armored vehicles and equipment to enhance operational effectiveness during joint missions with Haitian police. To strengthen the military corps in fighting gangs, the Haitian army has opened a recruitment campaign inciting citizens to enlist for national security. At least 3,000 candidates have already been selected. For many young people, in most cases unemployed and without job opportunities, the chance to become a soldier is particularly attractive.
On August 19, Haitian police used tear gas to disperse hundreds of peaceful protesters in Port-au-Prince who were demanding more decisive action against gang violence, frustrated by the recent failures of law enforcement. These protests occurred just days after a new prison breakout in Saint-Marc, central Haiti, the third such incident this year. Eleven suspected escapees were killed in shootouts with police, and one was recaptured.
Haiti continues to grapple with severe challenges, including persistent gang violence and domestic political turmoil, with the interim council facing accusations of corruption.
China-Philippines
Tensions in the South China Sea calmed somewhat after an agreement between China and the Philippines allowed the Philippines ship in the Second Thomas Shoal to be resupplied with food and water. However, in late August, the Philippines and China claimed that both sides had rammed coast guard vessels near another disputed island in the South China Sea. The Sabina Shoal, located 120 km from the Philippines and 1,000km away from mainland China, is emerging as the latest flashpoint between the two sides. The US responded by backing its treaty ally, the Philippines, and criticized China’s actions in the region. The Chinese defense ministry has repeatedly claimed that the US is pushing the Philippines to provoke China and damaging regional security.
The international response has become more of a factor in the South China Sea. The Philippines and Vietnam signed a significant defense cooperation agreement in late-August as both sides share concern over the growing assertiveness and claims in the South China Sea. Vietnam has also been constructing islands in its exclusive economic zone to control parts under threat from China in the South China Sea. However, the new collaboration reflects a recognition that it has to work with the Philippines. The competing claims over many of the islands in the South China Sea will continue to be a point of tension in the coming months.
About the authors
Arianna Lucà
Arianna is an intern at Dyami, covering the role of Research Intelligence Analyst to enrich her background knowledge in International Relations with topics involving security and conflict. She holds an MA in International Relations from Leiden University and an LLM in European Criminal Justice from Utrecht University. During her academic career, she volunteered for different NGOs, mainly Amnesty International, and Emergency and ActionAid, embracing humanitarian and conflict security causes, and addressing issues like famine and lack of security in different regions of the world. With Dyami, she is contributing to joint publications, writing articles, and keeping up to date with key regional developments.
Jacob Dickinson
Jacob studied Global Political Economy at Leiden University. He is passionate about international development and is looking to expand his expertise in geopolitics and crisis management. Curious about other cultures, he has traveled in Europe and Asia for both academic study and professional purposes. His expertise includes the geopolitics of oil and industrial upgrading in the electronics global value chain. He is particularly interested in the evolving political and economic relationships between China and ASEAN, and the consequences for regional development and security.
Kevin Heller
Kevin has over a decade of experience in the world of counter-terrorism as a consultant, trainer, and analyst. His background is in military Close Quarter Battle/Combat and Krav Maga for Military and Law Enforcement agencies. As a Global Intelligence Analyst, he writes Intel Briefs on conflict zones and terrorism.He has extensive knowledge of conflicts, politics, and other events happening in the Middle East. Kevin also has a background in Journalism and International Affairs/Conflict Studies.
Mark Bruno
Mark is a former noncommissioned officer in the US Army whose experiences and education have led him to a career as a cybersecurity and conflict analyst. His background in cyber and electronic warfare, combat medicine, open source intelligence, and information operations, have helped provide valuable insight to the Dyami team, where he now serves as the Information Security Officer.
Sara Frisan
Sara works at Dyami as a Geopolitical Intelligence Analyst, leveraging her background in Peace and Conflict Studies. Sara joined Dyami after completing her MA in Conflict Studies and Human Rights at Utrecht University and held an MA degree in International Sciences and Peace Studies. During her academic career, she conducted research in South America, primarily Colombia, on the dynamics of collaboration and resistance between civilians and non-state armed groups in violent settings. In her previous internship at the investigative think-tank InSight Crime, Sara developed some expertise on transnational organized crime and political-criminal alliances.
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