Written by Giulia Corradetti, Abigail Mikhail, Yusuf Babayusuf, Marnix Van ‘t Hoff, Iris de Boer, Jacob Dickinson, Sara Frisan
Russia-Ukraine: Zelensky announced Ukraine's intention to build nuclear weapons to ensure its security in case of a lack of NATO support.
Middle East Region: While on-ground operations continue against Gaza and Lebanon, hostilities escalate between Israel and Iran.
Myanmar: After a year of Operation 1027 the military junta is on the backfoot, with crisis situation for millions of civilians
Sudan: The conflict escalated following the SAF’s airstrike operations to regain ground in Sudan, particularly Khartoum.
United States: With November 5th presidential elections approaching, concerns over post-election violence are growing.
Moldova: Second round presidential elections will be held on November 3rd, amid concerns over Russian interference.
Georgia: The opposition rejects the Georgian Dream party's victory, denouncing electoral fraud.
Mozambique: Massive protests erupt upon the release of the October 2024 presidential election results.
Bolivia: Ahead of the 2025 presidential elections, pro-Morales protests and social unrest intensify.
Turkey: The attack by the PKK on Turkish aerospace industries led to retaliatory airstrikes and heightened security measures.
DRC: The M23 rebel group’s violence remains a pressing threat in the DRC.
Haiti: The crisis in Haiti remains exceptionally acute, with gangs expanding outside the capital and the political transition at risk.
Mexico: As cartel-related violence grips the country, the Supreme Court resigned to oppose judicial overhaul.
China-South China Sea: China’s coast guard assertiveness expands to Vietnamese fishermen and Indonesian oil projects.
China-Taiwan: Cross Strait relations are tense as China conducts naval and air military exercises around Taiwan.
Conflicts, October 2024
Russia-Ukraine
Earlier this month, Ukraine’s President Zelensky presented his ‘victory plan’ to Western supporters of Ukraine. The plan outlines a five-step plan to ensure Ukraine’s security, how to end the current conflict, and how to ensure Russia will not try taking Ukraine again. President Zelensky was frustrated with the relatively cold reception from Western leaders. On October 30, information from the secret part of the victory plan was leaked to the media, outlining Ukraine’s desire for Tomahawk cruise missiles to be donated, which have a reported range of 1500 to 2500 km. The results of this leak are playing out at the time of writing and might have long-term implications in the war, comparable to the breach of Ukraine’s plans for a summer counteroffensive in 2023.
As a response to the lukewarm response to Zelensky’s ‘victory plan’ and the wavering and lacking support by the West to guarantee the security of Ukraine during and ‘after’ the war, Zelensky announced that Ukraine is considering to start rebuilding its nuclear arsenal. The country got rid of its arsenal (and the bombers attached to that arsenal) with the 1994 Budapest Memorandum in return for security guarantees from Russia, and protection from the United States and the United Kingdom. Since Russia has invaded the nation (both in 2014 and 2022) and neither the US nor the UK protected Ukraine’s sovereignty, Ukraine is left as the only country abiding by the Budapest memorandum, it claims there is no reason for it to keep doing so. However, after meeting NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte on October 17, Zelensky said that Ukraine is not seeking to produce nuclear weapons after all.
Whether Zelensky genuinely wanted Ukraine to develop nuclear weapons, or it was made out of emotion, he has since toned down the call to develop nuclear weapons, especially in front of NATO member countries. The claim also might have been a calculated move to motivate NATO to include Ukraine in its protection after the current war is over/‘frozen’, something currently not guaranteed or accepted as an idea by all NATO members.
Middle East Region
The conflict between Israel and Hamas is ongoing, and the recent killing of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar on October 16 has dealt a blow to the organization. However, there seems to be little progress in ceasefire talks between Hamas and Israel. Talks regarding a ceasefire are in place, and on October 28, Mossad Chief discussed a new unified framework for the release of hostages with CIA Director William Burns and Qatari Prime Minister Mohammed Al-Thani. However, on October 31, Hamas rejected the hostage release deal, which also included a one-month pause in fighting in Gaza.
This month also signed the deadline for South Africa to present all the evidence to the ICJ to charge Israel guilty of genocide. The report was submitted on October 28. Regarding human rights protection, Israel’s Knesset approved two bills to ban the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) from operating on Israeli territory and areas under Israel’s control. In addition, on November 1, Israeli bulldozers severely damaged the UNRWA office in West Bank's Nur Shams camp, which is now no longer usable.
On the Lebanese front, the escalation of hostilities with Hezbollah has led to a ground war in the southern part of the country. Several Hezbollah strategic sites and financial institutions have been targeted over the weeks by Israel, which appears to be aiming at destroying the Iran-backed organization’s support. Israel is willing to consider accepting a ceasefire deal if Hezbollah withdraws from its position close to Israel's northern border and stops firing rockets into Israel. The recent appointment of the new Hezbollah leader, Naim Qassem, might bring the country close to a deal. Indeed, the latter stated on October 30 that Hezbollah is open to a possible ceasefire deal with Israel but threatened that they could keep up the attacks for months.
The past month has seen an escalation of hostilities between Israel and Iran. Iran launched over 180 ballistic missiles on October 1, 2024, against Israel and conducted several espionage operations in Israeli territory. On October 25, Israel retaliated by conducting airstrikes targeting Iran’s military assets. Iran said it is ready to respond, but the damage it underwent seems quite severe and might create an obstacle to the country's direct response. It is unlikely that Iran will ignore the attacks and may respond in the future, but it is possible that it will refrain from an open offense. The situation is unstable, and although Israel and Iran have never directly been involved in an open conflict against each other, the tension could escalate.
Neighboring Arab countries and the US fear that the whole region could become a warzone if the current conflicts continue and the tension between Iran and Israel escalates. Therefore, they have been pressuring for a halt to the hostilities and highlighting the necessity for a ceasefire in both Gaza and Lebanon.
Myanmar
October 2024 saw the anniversary of the beginning of Operation 1027 of the Three Brotherhood Alliance in the violent Myanmar conflict. The offensive has changed the pace of the Myanmar civil war significantly, with the mix of ethnic armed groups and pro-democracy forces now controlling swaths of the country in the northeast, in the west in Rakhine State, and approaching urban centers in Myanmar. The military junta has lost several strategic command posts and is unable to mount an offensive. Military junta troops are deserting en masse, prompting the junta to mass conscription to fill its ranks. The military junta has tried to stop the progress of Operation 1027 by bombing villages with aircraft and artillery and killing thousands of civilians. In Rakhine State, the Arakan Army and the military junta have been implicated in war crimes against civilians and the thousands of Rohingya who face starvation and mass displacement.
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations met in Vientiane, Laos, to discuss the crisis in Myanmar and implement a Five-Point Consensus for the conflict in Myanmar. The military junta was allowed to attend the summit for the first time since the coup in February 2021 due to its ties with the Laos special envoy. The plan proposes an end to the violence, constructive dialogue, and humanitarian aid but has yet to see results. Due to the military junta’s losing fight, China has been pushing the junta to hold elections, and the latter views China with increasing skepticism for endorsing the China-affiliated Kokang Army in seizing territory from the military junta.
Sudan
The humanitarian crisis is worsening in Sudan. October 2024 saw the Sudanese army (SAF) regain the advantage in the conflict over the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). There was a significant escalation in the conflict from the start of the month following the SAF’s operation to regain ground in Khartoum at the end of September. The attack was the SAF’s most extensive operation to regain ground since the conflict began. On October 13, the SAF conducted an airstrike targeting the main camp in southern Khartoum, occupied by the RSF. The strike killed 23 civilians as it also hit a nearby market and residential area. Another airstrike carried out by the SAF targeted a mosque located in the south of Khartoum, which resulted in the loss of 31 civilians. The most recent operation was carried out on October 23, when the SAF took back control of Al-Dinder in the Sennar State from the RSF.
On October 22, the RSF shot down a Russia-made ilyushin Il-76 cargo plane carrying Russian crew members in Darfur over suspects of carrying supplies to the SAF in Al-Fashir. On October 25, the RSF carried out one of the deadliest attacks since the beginning of the conflict. The mass killing targeted the Al Seriha village, South of Khartoum, and caused at least 124 victims. The conflict shows no signs of slowing down and has been exacerbated following multiple accusations from both sides of the war, claiming that UAE provided the RSF with military aid and Egypt has trained the SAF as well as being involved in airstrikes. Both Egypt and the UAE have denied claims of supporting either the RSF or the SAF.
Most recent data from the United Nations state that the conflict has led to 11 million displaced people inside Sudan and 3.1 million people displaced outside the country. Increased sexual violence, high levels of food insecurity, and the spread of disease are increasingly growing issues in the country, while international aid and support are underfunded and limited.
Alerts, October 2024
United States
Former President Donald Trump, as well as his challenger Kamala Harris, have ramped up their election campaigns as Election Day takes place on November 5, 2024. Recent election polls suggest that it will be an extremely tight race between Republican candidate Trump and Democrat candidate Harris, with all eyes on the seven “swing states”, namely Georgia, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Michigan, Wisconsin, Nevada, and Arizona. While for most states, it is clear whether its voter base will prefer Republicans or Democrats, in these “swing states”, the preference of the voter base is not set in stone and can shift until the moment of voting. This means the “swing states” usually play a crucial role in US elections. In addition, it is important to note that preliminary election polls are not reliable, and the outcome of the presidential elections in 2016 and 2020 was very different from what the polls expected. Hence, it will remain unclear until the end of Election Day on November 5 (local date) who will become the next President of the United States of America.
As election rallies by Trump and Harris continue, there is a heightened chance of protests in the US, especially at the rally and voting locations. Most recent protests have expressed support for or discontent with the stances of the election candidates, for example, about abortion rights, climate change, or the role of the US in the war in Gaza. Protests are expected to continue in the run-up to Election Day as well as its aftermath, with most of them being peaceful. However, peaceful protests can escalate due to the high level of polarization in US society. In addition, intelligence officials have expressed worries over the possibility of Russian and Iranian-backed actors encouraging violent protests.
A recent survey by The Associated Press-NORC for Public Affairs Research finds that 4 in 10 voters are concerned about political violence and attempts to overturn the election results. Grounds for such worries can be found in the past, for example, when Donald Trump did not accept his loss in the 2020 elections against current President Joe Biden. This ignited a mob of Donald Trump supporters storming the Capitol Building in Washington D.C., in an unsuccessful attempt to hinder the certification of the election results. The spread of misinformation on social media, which played a significant role in the Capitol attack in 2021, can once again create a basis for political violence in the aftermath of the 2024 Presidential Elections. There is also a high risk of misinformation being spread by fake social media accounts connected to unfriendly foreign actors. In addition, two assassination attempts on Donald Trump in 2024, confirmed by US authorities, further increase worries about political violence. Hence, security services will be on high alert during the upcoming weeks.
Georgia
Tensions in Georgia have risen over the 2024 Parliamentary Elections on October 26, 2024, and its results. Voters were able to choose between the ruling Georgian Dream Party and four other opposition coalitions. The Georgian Dream Party has recently been following a pro-Russian foreign policy, with the opposition coalitions and Georgia’s current President favoring a pro-European course. The Parliamentary Elections were thus seen as a pivotal moment for Georgia’s alignment concerning its foreign policy. Early results indicated that the opposition groups were on the winning side, but later on, the official results named the Georgian Dream Party the winner. The opposition coalitions and President Zourabichvili do not accept the results and accuse the Georgian Dream Party of vote-rigging, intimidation, and violence. Following the release of results, US President Biden, the EU, and other Western leaders called for investigations over the alleged electoral fraud. So far, only a few countries have accepted the Georgian election results, namely Azerbaijan, Armenia, Turkey, China, and Hungary.
The opposition called for protests on October 28, 2024, with thousands of voters adhering to the call and waving EU and Georgian flags outside parliament in Georgia’s capital. The Election Commission claimed that a partial recount of the votes confirmed the win of the Georgian Dream Party. However, the opposition is now asking the election commission to release the election data to prove the electoral fraud. It is still unclear whether this data will be shared and if it would indeed prove election fraud if shared. Prosecutors stated on October 30, that they started a probe into the alleged election fraud. While no additional opposition protests have been announced so far, it is possible that new protests against the election results will take place in the upcoming days. Georgian security forces are known for taking harsh measures during opposition protests against the ‘foreign agent law’ in May 2024, with violent clashes between protesters and security forces. Similar situations could take place in the upcoming days, especially if the election results will not be shared and the opposition will call for new protests.
Moldova
Elections in Moldova were held on October 20, 2024, with an EU referendum on the same day. The referendum was introduced by the current pro-European President, Maia Sandu, with her opponents claiming that the referendum was misused to guarantee her second term as President. While the referendum was expected to pass easily, the final results showed that just 50.4% of the voters chose 'yes' and 49.6% chose 'no'. According to Moldovan officials supporting the referendum, these results have been caused by Russian interference, creating irregularities in the voting process. The Moldovan General Police claimed that a Russian state bank and the Kremlin-supported opposition politician, Ilan Shor, have paid over 138.000 Moldovan citizens to vote ‘no’ during the referendum and to vote for pro-Russian presidential candidates. It is still unclear whether the Moldovan Constitutional Court will confirm the referendum results, for which it will make a final decision on November 4, 2024. If the results are rejected, there will be a new vote within two weeks. If the results are accepted, Moldova will amend its constitution and include joining the EU as one of its goals. However, it is possible that opponents of the referendum will protest this decision due to the low margin of ‘yes’ votes. It seems that the opposition is fighting the referendum results in the hope that the referendum will pass with a higher percentage of the population supporting it in a new vote, increasing the legitimacy of changing the country’s constitution.
The Presidential elections will go to a second round of voting on November 3, 2024, during which voters can choose between current President Maia Sandu and Alexandr Stoianoglo, who is supported by pro-Russian parties. While Sandu received a majority of the votes during the first round, it is possible that Stoianoglo’s votes will increase during the second round, with only two candidates to choose from. If Sandu loses the vote, she might reject the results and again blame Russia for its interference in the voting process.
Mozambique
Mozambique is experiencing an intense political crisis and social unrest following the contested presidential election on October 9, 2024. Massive protests erupted at the release of the official electoral results on October 24, which declared the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) ruling party candidate, Daniel Chapo, the country’s presidential election winner, having secured over 70 percent of the votes. Hundreds of opposition supporters took to the streets of the capital, Maputo, and other major cities, denouncing fraudulent election results. Security forces violently repressed the protests; at least 11 people were killed, and dozens were injured by live bullets and tear gas. Local NGOs reported the arrests of around 500 protestors for alleged engagement in public disorder, looting of shops, destruction of public and private property, and attacks on police stations and cars. The opposition leader Venâncio Mondlane, who ended second place in the election with 20 percent of the votes for his PODEMOS party, called for a one-week general strike starting on October 31. He also called for demonstrations at the National Electoral Commission (CNE) on November 7 to contest the results. On October 28, PODEMOS filed a lawsuit demanding the recount of the votes. In addition to Mondlane, Ossufo Momade, president of the traditional opposition party RENAMO, which gathered nearly 6 percent in the elections, called for the vote to be annulled. While election results still need to be validated by the Constitutional Council, further protests across the country and violent crackdowns by security forces are to be expected.
The latest protests and clashes came after weeks of social unrest in the country. Since the beginning of the electoral campaign in late August 2024, there has been a spike in election-related violence and alleged irregularities in polling. In the run-up to the elections, international electoral observers reported escalating violence and abuses, including assassinations, fraud, and intimidation of opposition candidates. Tensions escalated after PODEMOS Mondlane claimed victory on October 10 and denounced the assassination of two members of his party by security forces. The European Union, the African Union, and the UN called for investigations over the electoral process irregularities and Mozambique government repression. Human rights organizations, like Human Rights Watch, are urging for the immediate end of violence and the release of all the unjustified detained people and denouncing the excessive use of force by riot police and severe human rights violations, including extrajudicial killings, arbitrary detentions, intimidation, repression of the freedom of assembly and expression.
Bolivia
Bolivia is experiencing political instability and social unrest amid the growing rivalry between incumbent President Luis Arce and controversial former President Evo Morales (2006-2019) ahead of the 2025 presidential elections. Arce and Morales were once close allies but now compete for dominance of Bolivia's Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) leftist party. Arce replaced Morales as party leader in 2019, after the latter fled Bolivia following allegations of electoral fraud and was briefly forced into exile, and won the 2020 presidential election. The rivalry between Morales and Arce caused a deep political rift within the ruling party. In September 2023, Morales tried to exclude Arce from the party and announced his intention to run in the 2025 elections as the MAS candidate, with the support of a significant portion of party members. However, in December 2023, Bolivia's Constitutional Court prohibited his reelection. Following an attempted coup orchestrated by dissident Armed Forces officers led by General Zúñiga on June 26, 2024, Morales accused President Arce of having staged a self-coup to regain public support. Morales, though controversial, enjoys great influence and popularity among substantial segments of the population, including coca farmers, unions, and indigenous groups; on the other hand, Arce is facing simmering discontent and critics of mismanagement for the ongoing economic crisis, rising inflation, and fuel shortages.
Since mid-September 2024, anti-government protests and clashes have intensified. On September 23, major confrontations between Morales supporters and police forces supported by pro-Arce protesters occurred in the capital, La Paz. Tensions rose after Morales issued a 24-hour ultimatum to the Arce government, demanding cabinet change, and organized a week-long march across the country. Since October 14, Morales supporters have been maintaining roadblocks in multiple areas of the country to protest against Morales's possible arrest for the alleged rape of a minor. On October 27, Morales claimed he was the victim of a staged government assassination attempt after fourteen bullets hit his car. The Bolivian PM denied the allegations and stated the gunfight happened during an anti-drug check of the former President's convoy and that his security officers opened fire first. Pro-Morales protests to demand Arce's resignation turned violent on October 29. On October 30, President Arce made a plea to the Bolivian people to end the roadblocks that have caused more than $1.7 billion in economic losses over the past 17 days.
Updates, October 2024
Turkey
Conflict and security concerns escalated in Turkey in October 2024. The PKK claimed responsibility for an attack on Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) on October 23, which killed five people and injured 22 more. This prompted Turkish forces to launch retaliatory bombings on PKK sites in Northern Iraq and Syria. In response to the attack, the government increased security throughout the country, especially during the Republic Day celebrations on October 29. These measures included heightened security patrols at airports, transportation hubs, and public gatherings. The Republic Day celebrations in Ankara and Izmir were canceled.
In October 2024, Turkish authorities carried out major security operations, resulting in the arrest of over 230 people accused of having links to the PKK. Among these, the arrest of the mayor of Esenyurt caused outrage and raised questions about possible political intentions regarding the arrest. Social and political issues added to the difficulties in Turkey throughout October due to the broad condemnation of the attack on TAII and voicing concerns about human rights and political liberties.
Democratic Republic of Congo
The DRC continues to grapple with numerous armed groups, most notably the M23 rebel group, which reportedly generates $300,000 monthly from its control over the Rubaya mining area in the eastern region. While negotiations between Rwanda and the DRC were scheduled to commence earlier this month, the DRC accused Rwanda of creating obstacles to resolving the M23 conflict. On October 21st, the M23 expanded its territory by seizing the town of Kalembe, although the DRC army quickly reclaimed it the following day. This escalation in conflict has delayed the planned departure of UN MONUSCO peacekeepers, who are essential in providing aid, protection, and support to the 1.7 million people displaced by violence. Their potential withdrawal by the end of December 2024 poses significant risks for an already vulnerable region, and given the ongoing instability, the mission may need to extend beyond the scheduled date.
At the beginning of October, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) reported over 30,000 suspected cases of Mpox and more than 900 deaths. On October 5th, the European Union and the United States donated 265,000 doses of Mpox vaccines. With the support of the Ministry of Public Health and Prevention, as well as UNICEF and WHO, these vaccines were prioritized for distribution in vulnerable provinces across the country. Additionally, a boat capsized on Lake Kivu, claiming the lives of 78 individuals. The ongoing conflict between the Congolese Army and various rebel forces has forced many passengers and traders to rely on this lake as an alternative route, as roadways have become too dangerous due to rebel blockades.
Haiti
The situation in Haiti remains exceptionally volatile despite the deployment of Kenyan-led international support mission forces. The United Nations reported that the security and humanitarian crisis in Haiti has worsened over the past three months, with a 22% increase in displaced persons, which now exceeds 700,000. From July to September 2024, 1223 people were killed and 522 injured as a result of gang violence and security forces anti-gang operations. Among the gang-related casualties, at least 106 are attributable to arbitrary execution carried out by law enforcement. Among the targets of the security forces are also minors reported, at least six of whom are under the age of ten. Moreover, the UN reported an alarming rise in killings and violence by self-defense groups and sexual violence against women and children. The UN estimates that there are currently 5,500 gang members, about 50 percent of whom are minors and children.
Violence is reaching new peaks in the capital city of Port-au-Prince, which has been the epicenter of gang violence for months. Ramping-up gang attacks caused 10,000 internally displaced people in only a week. An increase in violence against civilians has been reported in the La Saline slum, with over 200 residents killed in the past few weeks. Gangs have also recently occupied the communities of Carrefour and Gressier in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area, gaining complete control. Since October 18, gangs have carried out repeated attacks and a week-long siege on the community of Solino, one of the few areas in the capital not yet under gang control. On October 24, gangs opened fire and struck a UN helicopter, forcing an emergency landing in Port-au-Prince, while two US airlines suspended flights to the Haitian capital. On October 25, the US announced the evacuation of all nonessential diplomatic personnel after gunmen targeted two US embassy vehicles. In October 2024, there was a new escalation of gang-related indiscriminate violence outside Port-au-Prince. It has been reported that gangs started attacking small boats and kidnapping the staff of international cargo companies. On October 3, an armed attack by gangs in the town of Pont-Sondé left at least 115 civilians dead and dozens injured. Gang attacks also were reported in the coastal town of Arcahaie, located northwest of Port-au-Prince, and in the central city of Estere, where gunmen opened fire near a school.
Given the rampant gang violence, concerns grow that the Kenyan-led Multinational Security Support (MSS) lacks the capacity and personnel to contain and resolve the crisis. In late October 2024, the President of Haiti's Transitional Presidential Council, Voltaire, urged the UN to transform or replace the MSS with a peacekeeping mission. The US, the main funder of the MSS, is also pushing for the installation of a peacekeeping mission to restore peace and political stability in Haiti. The deteriorating political environment further complicates the situation in Haiti, as the already fragile transition is hanging by a thread due to soaring tensions between PM Conille and the Presidential Transitional Council, which is urging the PM to replace some of the ministers.
Mexico
Only a few weeks into her term as Mexico's new President, Claudia Sheinbaum faces a complex political and security landscape. In recent weeks, the approval of a controversial judicial reform has sparked massive protests. Protesters and international observers argue that the reform could erode Mexico’s democracy by undermining the independence of the judiciary and strengthening the power of the ruling Morena party. The reform entails a full-scale judicial overhaul, introducing the popular election of judges. The Mexican Supreme Court published on October 28 a proposal to invalidate key points of the controversial reform; nonetheless, on October 31, 8 of the 11 Supreme Court justices handed in their resignations, refusing to participate in the elections for Supreme Court judges scheduled for June 2025. Moreover, investors and economic partners, including the United States, have expressed concern about the repercussions of the new legislation on foreign investment in the country and Mexican economic relations.
Meanwhile, the new administration has to deal with a widespread wave of increased cartel-related violence across the country. Sheinbaum launched a new security strategy, which renewed concerns over the increased presence of the militarized National Guard across the country. The killings of several political figures, including the latest murder of the mayor of Chilpancingo, Guerrero state, on October 6, are fomenting anger and frustration among the population. Amid the wave of violence, journalists have also been recently targeted. On October 30, two journalists were killed in western states. Moreover, violence has been spreading in Mexican western Sinaloa state as intra-cartel violence intensified since early September, following the arrest in the US of one of the cartel leaders, “El Mayo”, causing at least 300 victims and more than 250 others missing. On October 21, Mexican authorities announced the arrest of a local cartel leader and the killing of 19 alleged Sinaloa cartel members. On October 26, 14 civilians were killed in armed clashes in the state capital Culiacan. Despite the deployment of substantial security forces, including 650 National Guard and special forces officers, cartel violence and insecurity continues to worsen in the state of Sinaloa.
On top of the surge in violence and political turmoil, US election results will have significant impacts on the US-Mexican bilateral relationships on security, immigration, and trade. As the US presidential election approaches, trade concerns in Mexico are growing about the 2026 U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) review. A major risk for Mexico stemming from the US election is that a Trump administration could withdraw from the USMCA free trade agreement, leading to significant adverse impacts on the Mexican economy, inflation, and foreign investment. The migration crisis between Mexico and the US is also a hot topic for relations between the two countries. While Trump has promised mass deportations and Harris proposes tight asylum and migration control policies, the Mexican government has intensified the crackdown on illegal immigration, moving all non-Mexican migrants to the south of the country to slow and limit the entry of migrants into the US.
China-Taiwan
Tensions are high in the Taiwan Straits. Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te made a speech on October 10, 2024, stating that China had no right to represent Taiwan and declared his commitment to resist annexation or encroachment, repeating the same line as his predecessor, Tsai Ing-Wen. China responded on October 14 with extensive military exercises around the island, claiming that they were in opposition to ‘Taiwanese independence forces’. The Chinese military deployed the Liaoning aircraft carrier, ships, and aircraft to simulate a blockade of the island by cutting off ports and removing supplies to the island in the event of an invasion. The Taiwanese military was put on high alert for the duration of the drills and closely monitored the activities closer to the island.
The tensions in the Taiwan Strait highlighted the stakes of the intense geopolitical competition before the US presidential election. At the end of October, the US sold advanced surface-to-air missile systems and radar to Taiwan in its attempts to deter China’s military posturing on the island. As part of the Biden administration’s view that China poses a security threat to the Indo-Pacific, the US has sold further mid-range missile systems and placed them on the northern Philippines island of Luzon, established nuclear deals with Australia, the UK, and the US and established security ties between the cold neighbors of South Korea and Japan. China views the US military sales to Taiwan as stoking tensions on the Taiwan Strait and the broader system of alliances as an attempt to ‘contain’ China’s rise. Xi Jinping continues to make threats to build a military and capabilities to ‘fight and win wars’.
China-South China Sea
The maritime disputes in the South China Sea expanded beyond the China-Philippines in October 2024. In an expansion to other claimant states, Vietnam’s Communist Party condemned China’s ‘brutal behavior’ in its exclusive economic zone after it claimed that a Chinese Coast Guard attacked 10 Vietnamese fishing boats near the Paracel Islands by boarding the boats, attacking the fishermen, and sending them toward the coast. Vietnam said that China had violated Vietnam’s sovereignty in the Paracel Islands and that international law and agreements should be used to manage territorial disputes. The Indonesian Coast Guard drove a Chinese Coast Guard vessel away from an Indonesian oil and gas area in the South China Sea after three similar incidents in one week.
While China’s assertiveness against Vietnam and Indonesia is nothing new, the events over October 2024 mark a shift in strategy. China’s coast guard is growing in confidence in defending its claims in the South China Sea. China and the Philippines’ disputes over the Scarborough Shoal took place over the previous year and they have come to an agreement on the resupply mission to the Second Thomas Shoal. China has, until recent events, allowed Vietnam to continue building a new military base in its maritime territorial claim and stayed away from provoking Indonesia. For now, Vietnam and Indonesia are continuing their balancing act of encouraging infrastructure and economic links with China while reiterating their commitments to resolving territorial disputes peacefully and within the bounds of international law.
About the authors
Giulia Corradetti
Giulia is a junior intelligence analyst. She holds a BA in International Studies from the university of Trento, and she is currently studying Security Risk Management at the University of Copenhagen. During her academic career, she has collaborated with the University Journal “L’Universitario”, covering topics regarding international and security issues, such as conflicts involving the Asian region and human rights violations. With Dyami, she is contributing to joint publications, writing articles and briefs on current or developing security situations around the globe, and keeping up to date with key regional developments
Abigail Mikhail
Abbie is one of Dyami’s newest Security Analyst interns, bringing a strong academic foundation and international experience. She recently earned her Master's degree in Crisis and Security Management, with a focus on Intelligence and National Security. During her studies, she tackled a range of complex security issues, from the inner workings of the Chinese Intelligence Community to the repression in Iran. Her most notable project, conducted for the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT), involved investigating the repatriation of foreign fighters and offering key recommendations. Having lived across multiple countries, with 11 years in Beijing, China, Abbie draws on her rich cultural and global background.
Yusuf Babayusuf
Yusuf is a Safety and Security Management student at The Hague University of Applied Sciences, eager to apply his academic knowledge to real-world security challenges. He is particularly interested in geopolitical analysis, risk management, and the unique dynamics of Eastern Europe, Turkey, Central Asia and the Caucasus. Drawing from his cultural background and language skills in Turkish and Bulgarian. Yusuf is excited to learn from the experienced professionals at Dyami and contribute to their mission of creating a safer world.
Marnix Van ‘t Hoff
Marnix Van 't Hoff is an experienced Aviation Security Consultant & Trainer with a background in Aviation Studies from the Amsterdam University of Applied Sciences. He has a strong background in aviation security and has worked as a security risk and threat assessments (SRTA) specialist for aviation clients. He is an experienced crisis team leader and a HEAT trainer. His knowledge and expertise in these areas make him well-equipped to provide training, guidance and support to Dyami clients in ensuring the safety and security of their operations.
Iris de Boer
Iris works as a Global Intelligence Analyst at Dyami, leveraging her background in Human Geography. Additionally, Iris holds an MA degree in Conflict Studies and Human Rights from Utrecht University, specializing in conflict analysis, peace processes, and geopolitics. Her MA thesis delved into the securitization of the war in Ukraine by the Heads of State, Ministers of Foreign Affairs, and Ministers of Defense of the Netherlands and Poland. Within Dyami, Iris is actively involved in security risk management, travel security, and geopolitical analysis. Her enthusiasm for addressing topics in international security extends across a diverse spectrum of countries and regions
Jacob Dickinson
Jacob is a Geopolitical Intelligence Analyst at dyami. He studied Global Political Economy at Leiden University. Curious about other cultures, he has traveled in Europe and Asia for both academic study and professional purposes. His expertise includes the geopolitics of oil and industrial upgrading in the electronics global value chain. He specializes in the evolving political and economic relationships between China and ASEAN, and the consequences for regional development and security.
Sara Frisan
Sara works at Dyami as a Geopolitical Intelligence Analyst, leveraging her background in Peace and Conflict Studies. Sara joined Dyami after completing her MA in Conflict Studies and Human Rights at Utrecht University and held an MA degree in International Sciences and Peace Studies. During her academic career, she conducted research in South America, primarily Colombia, on the dynamics of collaboration and resistance between civilians and non-state armed groups in violent settings. In her previous internship at the investigative think-tank InSight Crime, Sara developed some expertise on transnational organized crime and political-criminal alliances.