Date: 28/02/2025
Where:
South-Eastern Australia, off the coast of Tasmania and New South Wales.
Who's involved:
China, Australia, New Zealand
What happened:
On 21/02/2025, the Task Group conducted a live-fire exercise. The exercise was criticized by both Australian and New Zealand officials. Canberra and Wellington, while recognizing that China is entitled to do so under international law, were concerned with the lack of advanced notification of the firing, which also lacked a Notice to Airmen (NOTAM), that caused "several commercial aircraft to divert course", a New Zealand Defence Force report stated. Another live-fire exercise was conducted on 22/02/2025.
On 19/02/2025, a Chinese Navy (hereafter PLAN; People's Liberation Army Navy) task force first entered Australia's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The flotilla, referred to as Task Group 107, consists of Renhai-class cruiser Zunyi (107), Jiangkai-class frigate Hengyang (568) and Fuchi-class replenishment oiler Weishanhu (887).
The Australian Defence Force (ADF) was first alerted to the Chinese live-firing exercise at 10:08 (UTC+10) on 21/02/2025, 38 minutes after China's exercise had started at 9:30. This was after a Virgin pilot transmitted mid-flight warnings to Airservices Australia, Australia's civil aviation authority.
Analysis:
This is the most recent example of China's ambitions in the Pacific. China often violates the EEZ of Taiwan and The Philippines and the Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) of the former. In the past few weeks, both the Philippine and Australian navies have reported dangerous incidents involving Chinese aircraft. On 18/02/2025, a PLAN Z-9 helicopter flew deliberately close (within 3 meters) of a Philippine government aircraft. For years, these two countries have been locked in an escalating series of confrontations over disputed waters in the South China Sea. On 11/02/2025, a Chinese Air Force (PLAAF; People's Liberation Army Air Force) J-16 fighter released flares 30 metres in front of an Australian Air Force (RAAF; Royal Australian Air Force) P-8 Poseidon surveillance aircraft. The deployment of Task Group 107 came as Australia was receiving Admiral Samuel Paparo, the head of the US Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM).
China justified the deployment by saying its actions were "entirely in accordance with international law." In line with the latter, Australia, unlike China, is limited to the 12 (nautical) mile line where it can exercise its sovereignty. With its nine-dash line, China claims much larger territorial waters. These are not recognized by international law, but China often uses them to justify deployments and grey zone actions.
As it already did with Taiwan and the Philippines, China could try to normalize these kinds of actions around Australia, especially insofar as the Australian government has lacked a proper response, at least publicly.
China may also use these deployments to test the Australian Navy's (RAN; Royal Australian Navy) response and try to keep it closer to home to limit the help it could provide to its allies in the Pacific, such as Taiwan, Japan and the United States. In the case of Taiwan, the previously mentioned head of INDOPACOM, Adm. Samuel Paparo, has already mentioned the Chinese escalation in demonstrations of force toward Taiwan, which are "not exercises, they are rehearsals". According to Paparo, China is showing "clear intent and capability" to attack Taiwan. Recent satellite imagery showing a flotilla of specially-built barges, eerily suitable for a Taiwan landing, also points to real intent on China's side.
Conclusion:
The recent PLAN deployment near Australia and New Zealand shows the PLAN's rapidly growing power and reach. It is likely meant to normalize the Chinese Navy's presence in the region. During the deployment, the PLAN likely monitored Canberra's and Wellington's response and their naval response regarding readiness, tactics and resolve. After cementing its reach and presence in the South China Sea, a body of water China has long claimed as its own, Beijing appears to be projecting its power further away from its coasts. Since the helicopter event of 18/02/2025 was highly likely aimed at the Philippine government, no similar actions against commercial flights are anticipated during the Chinese deployments.