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Date: 20/08/2024
Where: Haiti
Who’s involved: Kenya-led MSS,
Haiti security forces, gangs
What happened?
Haiti has been experiencing a deteriorating security and humanitarian crisis since the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse in 2021. In September 2022, a powerful coalition of gangs, known as the G9 Family led by Jimmy “Barbecue” Cherizier, took control of several parts of the capital Port-au-Prince. The security situation further deteriorated in late February and March 2024, when gangs launched a series of coordinated attacks in response to former de facto PM Ariel Henry’s agreement for the deployment of Kenyan police officers in the country. The escalation of violence and the unrest led to a political crisis, the resignation of the contested PM Henry, and the installation of a transitional council. Haiti's new government was announced in June 2024, led by Prime Minister Garry Conille.
Amid growing insecurity and gang-related violence in Haiti, the UN Security Council approved to send a Kenyan-led multinational force, the Multinational Security Support (MSS), to assist the Haitian government in countering armed gang violence in October 2023. The MSS’ aim is primarily to train the Haiti National Police (PNH) to defeat the armed gangs and lead to a situation where it will be possible to hold democratic elections.
The initial forces of the MSS arrived in the country on 25/06/2024, after several postponements. Currently, 400 of the 2500 planned forces have been deployed in Haiti. Along with Kenya, other countries, including the Bahamas, Bangladesh, Chad, Barbados, Jamaica and Benin, are planning to join the support mission.
Since their arrival, Kenyan forces are not achieving significant results and advances against the gangs, which control 90% of the capital. The main accomplishment of the MSS has been taking back control of the largest public hospital in Haiti.
Analysis:
Haiti is grappling with a prolonged economic, political and security crisis. The crisis was exacerbated by the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse in 2021. The recent escalation of gang-related violence and political instability has worsened the already precarious situation. In Haiti there are more than half a million internally displaced people, about 5.5 million people in immediate need of humanitarian assistance, and about 45% of the population facing food insecurity. Kidnappings and murders have soared in recent months, with over 3,200 reported killings in 2024.
The MSS is widely regarded as a key response to Haiti's security issue, welcomed as a “unique opportunity” to restore order by Haiti’s interim PM Conille, and praised by US President Biden as “the best chance” to restore democratic governance in the country. However, the MSS has been presented with structural and mandate issues that make it unlikely to achieve its goals, and is spawning significant controversies.
First, the MSS’s mandate and long-term strategies are not clear and transparent. Although authorized by the UN Security Council, the MSS mission operates outside the supervision of the UN and involves limited involvement of Haitian authorities and civil society. Haitian authorities, including the Presidential Security Council and law enforcements, appear to have limited influence and knowledge of the MSS mission's operational strategies. The lack of cooperation between the government and the MSS undermines the credibility and legitimacy of the mission.
The main objective of the MSS is to support and train Haiti’s national police (PNH) into tackling gang violence and assist the government in restoring law and order, addressing the humanitarian crisis and advancing the political process. However, little progress has been made for Haitian police capacity building. The risk is that the MSS mandate ends leaving the PNH untrained and in an unchanged unstable environment.
Slow progress shows that the mission may lack adequate resources and equipment. The MSS force lacks critical assets such as helicopters, combat vehicles, and necessary infrastructure, to combat the estimated 5,000 to 10,000 gang members entrenched in and around Port-au-Prince. The situation has increased pressure on the operation’s main sponsor, the US, to boost financial support and deploy additional resources. Beyond financial aid, the MSS also requires more personnel. Although additional forces were expected from countries like the Bahamas, Bangladesh, and Jamaica, their deployment remains uncertain.
Moreover, human rights organizations and Haitian civil society expressed concerns over the lack of clear accountability mechanisms to address potential human rights violations. Haiti has a troubled history with international interventions and impunity. The last international intervention, the U.N.’s 2004-2017 MINUSTAH mission, resulted in a massive sexual abuse scandal and a cholera epidemic. MINUSTAH have caused widespread distrust of foreign forces in Haiti, and part of the civil society remains opposed toward international interventions. Moreover, Amnesty International has pointed to the Kenyan police’s troubling human rights record, including recent allegations of brutality towards protesters in Nairobi, last June 2024.
Finally, the MSS lacks a long-term strategy to address and solve the root causes of the cycle of violence in Haiti. Besides the short-term goal of assisting and training the Haiti National Police (PNH) in fighting gangs, the MSS has a marked military-centric approach which will prove ineffective in the long run in identifying and resolving the socio-economic and political drivers underlying the gang violence and dynamics in the country. Gangs in Haiti are deeply intertwined with society, the political sphere, and the private sector and cannot be eradicated by military force alone. Moreover, Haitian gangs are linked with regional criminal organizations and successfully finance their activities by participating in transnational illicit networks, mostly arms and drugs trafficking.
Kenya has recently experienced a big wave of anti-government protests that lasted for over a month. Although not reported by the media, it is also possible that further turmoil in Kenya might have an impact on the Kenyan forces deployed in Haiti, perhaps requiring them to go back to provide support in their country.
Conclusion:
Nearly two months after the arrival of the international MSS forces little has changed in the volatile security environment in Haiti. Despite the deployment of international forces, the humanitarian crisis and escalating gang-related violence is intensifying. The mission, greeted with great enthusiasm by the international community and the Haitian ad interim government, does not seem to be able to meet expectations due to discrepancies between the ambitious objectives and actual resources and the lack of a clear mandate. The inconsistencies of the MSS and the lack of tangible improvements for the local population threaten to exacerbate frustrations and distrust toward local authorities and foreign forces, jeopardizing the credibility and legitimacy of the Kenyan-led mission. Moreover, ensuring the success of the MSS requires a long-term strategy to address gang violence and governance with a more holistic approach. Capacity building of the Haitian police force and greater involvement and ownership of the country's stabilization process by the government and local stakeholders are imperative steps to accomplish the objectives of the MSS.
