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Date: 21/08/2024
Who’s involved?
Ukrainian government, Russian government, the Ukrainian Armed Forces, the Russian Armed Forces
What happened?
Ukraine invaded Russian territory in the Kursk region on 06/08/2024. This time multiple Ukrainian brigades were dedicated to the attack, as opposed to smaller contingents of Russian nationals seen in 2023 and early 2024 with groups such as the Freedom of Russia Legion and the Siberian brigade.
Mass amounts of Russian POWs were taken, largely consisting of conscripted forces. This caused backlash in Russia, resulting in the first Russian initiated prisoner exchange talks.
In the following days, airstrikes hit Russian air bases, which were suspected of housing the aircraft responsible for the mass glide-bomb attacks on Ukrainian lines. Most recently, Ukraine blew up three bridges, effectively cutting off 600km2 of land, and an estimated 3000 Russian troops from the rest of Russia.
Russian forces have been unable to come up with a quick response to the Ukrainian incursion, losing large amounts of reinforcing troops to ambushes. However, Russian defenses seem to slowly be established by now.
What is Ukraine’s motivation?
Diversion of Russian troops: This goal is both short- and long-term. In the short-term, as a direct effect of this incursion, Russia will have to redirect troops from the active front lines in Ukraine to the Kursk region. This results in slightly less pressure on Ukrainian troops on those lines. In the longer-term, this incursion is likely to make Russia dedicate more troops to the defense of its own borders, locking these troops out of combat in Ukraine. If Russia opts to not do so, it runs the risk of falling to another incursion in the future. This balances the ‘field’ more, as Ukraine has had to protect all of its border shared with Russia, and even Belarus, since the start of the full-scale invasion in February 2022.
Denying Russia rest: Russia has been on the offensive since March 2024. Offensive operations always cost more manpower, equipment, and ammunition than defensive operations. At the point of culmination, when an offensive has lost all of its momentum, an army typically takes a defensive posture to ‘recharge’. This moment will arrive soon for the Russian army, but they will likely not be able to rest, as it is unlikely that Putin will allow Ukraine to hold Russian territory for long. This means the Russian army will have to stay on the attack in the Kursk region, after being on the attack for months already. This will likely hurt their future war effort.
Bringing the war to Russia: For the first time since the start of the full scale war, large swaths of Russian land, over 1000km2 has been occupied by Ukrainian forces. This forced Russian citizens to flee, and showed Russians living near Ukraine that they are not safe from this war. This (for now) massively successful Ukrainian incursion also showed the Russian citizens that Putin is not as in control of the situation as he outwardly portrays to be, hurting the stability of his position.
Diplomatic leverage: If peace talks will happen, and Ukraine is still holding Russian territory, this ensures Kyiv leverage at the negotiating table. However, (for now) Ukraine’s official stance is that they do not plan to hold the Russian territory in the long-term.
Seize successes on the battlefield: It has been a while since Ukraine had any major gains on the battlefield, dating as far back as late 2022. This new success does not only hurt Russian morale, but it is also likely to significantly boost Ukrainian morale. It is critical that Ukraine continues this operation successfully, and if/when pulling out of Russia, does not incur major losses of personnel or machines.
POW exchange fund: Ukraine managed to capture record amounts of POWs in the two weeks (at the time of writing) of this operation. Reportedly, over 2000 Russian soldiers were captured. As declared by Zelensky, these POWs will be used to exchange captured Ukrainian soldiers. The Azov fighters captured at Mariupol are specifically mentioned. Due to both the scale and conscript nature of most of the POWs taken in Kursk, Russia is more inclined to exchange POWs to quell unrest in Russia itself.
Show to ‘the West’ Ukraine’s capabilities to win: As mentioned before, the last Ukrainian victory on the frontlines was more than a year ago in 2022. One of the main reasons used by those who oppose supporting Ukraine in ‘the West’ is the claim that Ukraine does not have the capability to win the war. This incursion into Kursk shows Ukraine’s capabilities and potential. This may motivate Western leaders to donate more equipment to Ukraine.
Conclusion
Ukraine’s operation into Kursk can be seen as a great success for Kyiv (at the time of writing). Multiple goals have been achieved, and there are no signs of the Ukrainian Armed Forces decreasing their efforts anytime soon. As they still hold the upper hand, and dictate the fighting, there is potential for further success. It will however be critical for Ukraine to not let this operation end with major losses while holding onto territory against mass attacks from Russia, if those will happen. This would take away from the success of this operation and severely damage Ukrainian morale.
