Date: 09/10/2024
Who’s involved?
Maia Sandu and the Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS)
Alexandr Stoianoglo supported by the Party of Socialists (PSRM)
Nine other election candidates
The Russian Federation
The European Union
What happened?
Presidential elections in Moldova will take place on 20/10/2024. On the same day, Moldova will hold an EU membership referendum in which voters will answer the question “are you for the accession of the Republic of Moldova to the European Union?”.
Eleven candidates are participating in the Presidential elections, which will be held according to a two-round system. Election polls suggest that current President Maia Sandu will compete with former Prosecutor General Alexandr Stoianoglo during the second round of the elections.
Maia Sandu is a pro-European election candidate and leads the Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS). Critics have mentioned that her party is exploiting the EU referendum to guarantee a second presidential term. Alexandr Stoianoglo has been put forward by the Party of Socialists (PSRM) as a candidate that seeks to represent a unified opposition. The PSRM is a pro-Russian party and it is believed to have close ties with the Kremlin.
The outcome of the EU referendum will determine whether Moldova will amend its constitution by adding two new paragraphs that reaffirm the European identity of Moldova as well as its European course, and that declare Moldova’s integration into the EU as a strategic objective.
Moldovan officials have warned of Russia’s interference in the Presidential elections and the EU referendum. They reported that pro-Russian groups that are directly paid by the Kremlin are behind a wave of vandalizations of state buildings in Chișinău, try to convince voters to choose for pro-Russian election candidates and a ‘no’ vote during the referendum by paying them money, and are planning to seize government buildings.
Context:
Moldova’s current government, led by Maia Sandu, has worked to enable the country’s accession into the European Union and officially applied in 2022. Moldova is now holding an EU candidate status and has moved to the second stage of accession negotiations in 2024.
While Russia worked together with the US and EU in order to bring down the regime of Vladimir Plahotniuc in Moldova in 2019, the Kremlin is currently conducting a destabilization campaign in order to increase its influence and hinder Moldova’s EU accession process. Russia mainly focuses on the Moldovan break-away regions Transnistria and Gagauzia, where it spreads disinformation, financially supports residents, and helped to install pro-Russian governors. In addition, there are Russian troops stationed in Transnistria. These troops have already been here since 1992 and stayed as part of a peacekeeping mission in 1995. However, the current government of Moldova sees the continuation of Russian military presence in Transnistria as illegitimate.
It is believed that the final goal of the Kremlin is to bring down the current pro-European government of Moldova and to replace it with a pro-Russian puppet government. The upcoming Presidential elections and EU referendum are thus the perfect occasion for Russia to pursue this goal. An increase in destabilizing actions performed by pro-Russian groups, believed to be paid by the Kremlin, is expected in the run-up to the elections.
Recent polls still suggest that Maia Sandu is going to win the elections and that the majority of the voters will be in favor of the EU referendum. However, polls are not completely trustworthy and it is still unclear what the effect of the Russian destabilization campaign will be on the election results.
Scenarios:
If Sandu wins the elections and the referendum will pass, Moldova’s pro-European course is reaffirmed by the public and the amendment of the constitution will be a solid signal towards the EU that the country won’t wander from the path to EU accession. The amendment of the constitution will give Sandu’s government legitimacy to change certain laws and regulations to align with the EU accession requirements.
There is also an option that Sandu wins the elections, but that people will vote against the EU referendum. This will make it more difficult for Sandu’s government to change laws and regulations in order to meet the EU accession criteria, as the constitution won’t necessarily support such changes. The latter is a solid argument for the opposition to fight the pro-European course of Sandu’s government.
If Stoianoglo wins the elections and the referendum won’t pass, it is likely that Moldova will increase its ties with Russia and that the government abstains from continuing the path to EU accession. This will be fought by the opposition, but as Moldova’s aim for EU accession is not implemented in its constitution, the opposition won’t have many tools in place to secure the continuation of the EU accession process. In this case, it is expected that the accession process will stagnate. Protests by pro-European citizens might take place.
When Stoianoglo wins the elections and people will vote in favor of the EU referendum, it is likely that Stoianoglo will still not change the constitution as Russia will pressure Stoianoglo’s government and the referendum is not binding. In this case, it is likely that ties with the EU will erode and that Russia increases its influence over Moldova to make it align with the objectives of the Kremlin.
Conclusion:
The Moldovan presidential election as well as the EU referendum will highly influence Moldova’s alignment with the European Union as well as its alignment with the Russian Federation. Multiple scenarios are possible and 20/10/2024 will be an important day for many Moldovan citizens. However, it is sure that the election results and the results of the EU referendum will be closely followed in Brussels as well as in the Kremlin. An increase in destabilizing actions by Russia as well as a close monitoring of the election process by the EU is expected. There is a possibility of protests against the results of the presidential election and the EU referendum in the aftermath of 20/10/2024.