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This publication is part of a larger report on the Horn of Africa region. The report expands on the contentions surrounding Ethiopia’s desired access to ports and the construction of the Grand Renaissance Dam, followed by insights into the most recent developments and emerging security issues related to the aforementioned. To access the full report please email alessia@dyami.services
Date: 07/10/2024
Location: Horn of Africa
Who is involved: Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, Turkey
What happened?
Ethiopia’s pursuit to Red Sea Access
On 02/01/2024 Ethiopia and Somaliland signed a "New Year's Day Deal": Ethiopia gained access to a port through leasing 20km of Somaliland’s coastline. Additionally, Ethiopia secured a 50-year lease on a naval base. In exchange, Ethiopia promised to, at some point, officially recognize Somaliland as a sovereign state.
Prior to the agreement: Ethiopia has actively sought access to a port, which it lost in 1993 when Eritrea gained independence. Ethiopia relied on Djibouti for 90% of its trade through ports. This cost Ethiopia approximately $1.5 billion annually. The agreement would significantly impact Djibouti's port-dependent economy.
Following the agreement: Somalia protests Ethiopia's recognition of Somaliland. Somalia demands withdrawal of Ethiopian forces from Somalia by the end of 2024. Removal of Ethiopian forces weakens Ethiopia's defense against regional threats.
Escalating Tensions and Regional Rivalries
In August 2024, Somali and Ethiopian foreign ministers met twice in Ankara, Turkey to discuss disagreements over the port deal Ethiopia signed with Somaliland in January. Turkey maintains economic ties with both Ethiopia and Somalia, providing a foundation for its mediation efforts.
On 08/02/2024 Turkey signed a “Defence and Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement” with Somalia, a 10-year defense deal that will see Ankara helping Mogadishu with security cooperation and building the capacity of its naval forces, further solidifying Turkey’s influence in the area.
On 13/08/2024 Turkey proposed an arrangement allowing Ethiopia sea access via Somalia which is contingent on Ethiopia recognizing Somalia's territorial sovereignty.
On 14/08/2024 Egypt signed a defense pact with Somalia. The agreement replaces departing Ethiopian troops with 10,000 Egyptian troops. Half of the troops join “Africa Transition Mission In Somalia”, while the other half is stationed in Mogadishu. Egyptian troops will also train the Somali army to combat terrorist groups.
On 27/08/2024 Egypt strengthened its military alliance with Somalia by sending two C-130 military aircraft filled with weapons. This event marks the first military aid from Egypt to Somalia in decades.
On 19/09/2024 Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan stated that Turkey aims to meet with Somalia and Ethiopia separately to resolve the dispute.
On 23/09/2024 Egypt reinforced their security pact with Somalia by sending an Egyptian warship to the Mogadishu port, carrying anti-aircraft guns and artillery. Egypt pledges continued support for Somalia's security, stability, and development. At the same time, Egypt issued a statement urging citizens in Somaliland to leave immediately via Hargeisa Airport. Advisory warns against travel to the region due to escalating security concerns.
Analysis
The situation in the Horn of Africa is precarious, with Ethiopia and Egypt supplying arms to different groups in Somalia, there is a significant risk of a proxy war. To prevent military escalation, a binding agreement is crucial.
If agreements on the port deal fails, Ethiopia might ratify the recognition of Somaliland as a sovereign state in exchange for the use of the port and naval base. This could lead to increased tensions and political conflict in the region.
Tensions between Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia over the region’s precarious water supply might also escalate. Regional destabilization could occur involving neighboring countries and regional actors, likely backing Egypt due to shared water security concerns, into a conflict. Civilian casualties, mass migration, and strained regional resources would draw in neighboring countries and international intervention for aid and support. This would lead to a severe humanitarian crisis that would be detrimental to the region and beyond.
Conclusion
The escalating issues—rooted in water insecurity, port access, and shifting military alliances—have naturally raised fears of an inter-state conflict. It is crucial for negotiations to continue and an agreement be drafted so as to not allow the region to turn to military escalation.
To access the full report on the tensions in the Horn of Africa and the broader region please contact Alessia@dyami.services
