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Date: September 2024 - February 2025
Who is involved:
Ukraine, Russia, US, EU, Iran, North Korea, China
In this report:
What has been happening?
Expectations
Conclusions
What has been happening?
In order to get an understanding of where the war is likely going, it is important to look at the major events and factors that have happened and influenced the war in the past months.
Battlefield Russia
In a surprise turn of events, Ukraine invaded Russia on the 6th of August. The Russian military’s poorly prepared, lightly manned defenses on its Kursk region border were overrun without much of a struggle. Many conscripts posted on these positions were captured in great numbers, further discussed below. Russia’s response to set up a proper defense with professional military units has been slow, and a significant portion of the units initially responding to the invasion were destroyed in ambushes on their way to the battlefield. Reportedly over 1250km2 of the Kursk region has been captured by Ukraine at the time of writing. Speculation on Ukraine's intent is to not maintain a hold over (all) the acquired territory. There are several signs of Ukrainian armed forces constructing defensive works in Russia, suggesting they are planning to hold on to at least some of the gained grounds, or at least make it a costly operation for the Russians to bring the territory back under Russian control.
POW galore
The opening week of the Ukrainian invasion into Russia saw a record number of Prisoners Of War (POWs) taken. In one incident, over 100 POWs were captured in one go. Many of these new prisoners are Russian conscripts, a group normally not directly exposed to war raging in Ukraine. The capturing of these conscripts in great numbers raised concern amongst the civilian population in Russia, as their family members before were not directly exposed to the risk of dying or getting captured in combat. Ukraine stated proudly that all the POWs taken will be used for the ‘POW exchange fund’, in a move to secure the release of Ukrainian prisoners, many still from the battle of Mariupol now more than two years ago.
Eastern front
The Russian Armed Forces are slowly but steadily crawling forward on the eastern front line. Now approaching the vicinity of some key towns and cities, battles on this front are not expected to reduce. These advances have been extremely costly for the Russian forces, both in manpower as in equipment. It however seems that as long as the slow crawl forward continues, the Russian Armed Forces command is not planning on giving up on offensive operations despite the cost that comes with it.
Southern front
The southern front has seen the littlest movement of the three. This does not mean combat is not conducted however. Most notable is the surrender of Krynky, the small foothold held by the Ukrainian Armed Forces on the left bank (Eastern bank) of the Dnipro river. After months of fighting over the small bridgehead, which mainly served a symbolic function, the terrain and town were demolished to such an extent that there was hardly any cover left.
Ukrainian domestic (weapon) developments
Ukraine is setting up and increasing its domestic weapon production. Cheap drone variants are being made en masse, not just by the Ukrainian military industrial complex, but also by people from their homes and soldiers near the front lines. On the other end of the spectrum is the new “drone rocket” ‘Паляниця/Palyanitsya’, a weapon resembling a cruise missile in its manner of attack. The Palyanitsya is likely developed partially because of the lack of permission from the US to use their donated ATACMS missiles against targets deep inside Russia. The Palyanitsya has a reported range of around 500 km, placing military airfields previously deemed safe, well within targeting range. Besides fully domestic developed weapons, European companies are setting up production facilities in Ukraine. Rheinmetall will set up shop to produce tanks (likely the Leopard 2) and air defense systems and munitions for these systems. Norwegian company Nammo recently allowed the production of their developed artillery ammunition in Ukraine. The relatively scarcely delivered CV90 Infantry Fighting Vehicle will reportedly be produced in Ukraine itself in the future as well, with modifications allowing the vehicle to perform better on the terrain type of Ukraine, as this was the only ‘complaint’ the Ukrainian armed forces have of the vehicle. Besides this, many more CV90s will be produced for Ukraine in Sweden, the country which developed the vehicle.
Producing additional weapon systems and munition to bolster supplies for the front line is not the only motivation for Ukraine to establish domestic production. At the moment, Ukraine heavily leans on the West, and the US in particular, to supply the country with enough weapons and munitions to fight off Russia. Historically, the West has not provided indefinite support to any nation or group it was helping, usually leading to the demise of said nations or groups. Not wanting the same fate, it serves Ukraine well to be able to at least primarily rely on its domestic production. This also will eventually negate the long waiting times for supplies to arrive, when production is up and running.
Attacks on energy/military infrastructure
Ukraine continued its successful campaign against Russian military and energy infrastructure. When referring to energy, it consists mostly of oil and fuel facilities, which support the Russian war machine. In recent months, one could even consider this campaign as escalated, as Ukrainian strikes on Russian soil are an almost daily occurrence by now. While not all attacks are successful, some of the ones that are, are very high profile. Such as the recent strike against the oil/fuel storage in Proletarsk, which at the time of writing has been burning for more than a week. Other strikes have reached into Russia over 1700 km beyond the original borders.
Foreign support for Russia
North Korea showed a great amount of support for Russia. Beyond the known ammunition support by North-Korea earlier this year, North-Korean vehicles were sighted fighting in Ukraine. These have a unique design, making them stand apart from the vehicles in use by Russia. Specifically, these Bulsae 3 or 4 are tank hunting vehicles. Constructed on modified BTR-60 or 80 platforms, they are equipped with ‘TV-missiles’. Capable of destroying targets ~10km away, this vehicle is likely very effective in combination with the plentiful small scale drones active on the frontline. Reasons for North Korea to donate vehicles does not necessarily indicate a shortage in the Russian supplies. A likely explanation is that North Korea sees the donation of some of its vehicles as a good way to test how these would fare in a real world combat scenario, while improving relations with Russia.
Foreign support for Ukraine
After the US eventually approved its bill (Ukraine Security Supplemental Appropriations Act, 17/04/2024) including the aid package for Ukraine, the situation on the front lines quickly saw a drastic improvement for Ukraine. Shortly followed by the limited approval by western countries to use donated weapon systems directly on or against Russian territory. This again noticeably improved the situation for Ukraine, as it was finally able to take out at least some of the positions in Russia threatening cities like Kharkiv. The limits stated by some nations, including the US, however do still significantly limit Ukraine’s striking ability against Russia.
A big development in western support for Ukraine is the arrival and deployment of the long awaited F-16s. While for now only a small first batch of around six are active over Ukraine, this number will crawl up to over 60. This alone will not turn the course of the war, nevertheless they are expected to be a valuable asset for Ukraine. In fact, during the mass missile/drone attack on 26/08/2024, F-16s were used to intercept incoming munitions. The F-16’s flight characteristics makes it a very suitable aircraft for these types of operations. Both Denmark and the Netherlands allow Ukraine to use their donated F-16s directly against and over Russia, whereas Belgium has not given this approval.
Crimea
The peninsula is still a hotspot for military activity. This comes mostly down to aerial attacks or naval Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USV). While no direct attempt for the peninsula by Ukraine is expected anytime soon, Russian military and logistical targets are under heavy duress on Crimea. While the Russian Kerch bridge has recently not seen a(n attempted) strike, the alternative train-ferries have been destroyed in recent months. Naval activity by Russia on Crimea is almost completely over, with most ships withdrawn to Russia. Air defense systems on the island are frequent targets for Ukrainian aerial attacks, costing Russia many resources to maintain a formidable defense on the peninsula.
Black Sea
Due to the retreat of most of the Russian Black Sea fleet, the Black Sea saw a reduction of activity, albeit not a total absence. Ukraine managed the sinking of some ships, including a submarine that was only recently in the water again after being damaged almost one year ago.
Expectations
Russian winter focus
As the winter makes combined arms operations difficult in Ukraine, Russia is likely to switch back to its aerial attack focus, as it did last winter. It might try to continue its forward grind, or the Russian Armed Forces will bunker down in anticipation of a Ukrainian counter offensive. If the Russian territory taken by Ukraine is not recaptured by Russia, it is highly likely that Russia will focus on reestablishing its control over these areas, even if the weather does not suit offensive operations well.
Ukrainian winter focus
It is hard to tell if the Ukrainian Armed Forces are planning any offensive operations this coming winter. While the winter will bring the ‘muddy season’ making combined operations difficult, Ukraine has surprised many with some of its actions and achievements in the past months. Not many people, if any, expected Ukraine to directly invade Russia itself, so anything is possible coming winter. What however is likely, is that Ukraine will expand on its air campaign, which has been growing both in quality and quantity over the past months. More use of the Palyanitsya is almost certain, and as the F-16s are drip fed into the country, it is likely Ukraine will regain (some) control over its own airspace. This does not only go for countering Russian aircraft threatening Ukraine, but also in intercepting UAVs and missiles. The use of F-16s in an aggressive role is unlikely, as this raises the risk of losses substantially.
Developments in the West
As Europe is moving ever so slowly towards being able to stand on its own legs, both defensively as in supporting Ukraine, all eyes are on the US. The coming election season could have a major impact on Ukraine and the support it can expect from the US. If Kamala Harris wins the election, not much change is to be expected. The biggest question is what happens if Donald Trump is elected again. In the past, Trump announced that he would stop all aid to Ukraine, and “stop the war within 24 hours”. However, after a meeting with Polish president Duda earlier this year, Trump’s and the Republican party’s opinion on the subject was (at least temporarily) adjusted. The way Trump and the Republican party will approach the subject is something which has to be seen after the elections.
Most European countries are investing heavily into their militaries. However, as is the case with democracies and bureaucracies, developments are slower than expected and hoped. On the other hand, once the proverbial steam train is rolling, it is expected expansion of military power and production will grow exponentially. This will eventually allow Europe to carry more weight in supporting Ukraine, if not all of it, if the US decides to fully drop support to Ukraine.
“Every army is always perfectly prepared to fight the previous war”. Western armies generally are fully oriented around fighting a counter terrorism/insurgency conflict after around twenty years of fighting the Global War On Terror. Armies will have to shift their doctrine again to fighting a peer or near-peer level conflict, to prepare for the worst case scenario of the Ukraine war escalating to a NATO-Russia level conflict. The war in Ukraine is watched closely by military leaders in the West exactly because of this. As an example, the Polish army has been seen training in trench warfare, a tactic once thought belonging to history which fully resurfaced in Ukraine.
Assessment on Russia
While large open discontent amongst the Russian population comes up every now and then, with the most recent example being Kursk region inhabitants. Voices of discontent in Russia usually are upset with the way the Kremlin is fighting the war, and not that it is being fought at all. This for now leaves the option of Russia halting its war due to internal pressure, by for example upset family members due to the loss of their relative, outside of the realm of possibilities.
The equipment used by the average Russian soldier has improved over what it was a year ago. (Real) body armor and helmets are more prevalent, and soldiers are seen more and more wearing the same type of camouflage as well as combat boots instead of sneakers. Storm-Z and other such units made up of criminals are less prevalent on the front line. This indicates a shift in Russian effectiveness on the battlefield, although its losses are still staggering partially due to its continuous aggressive stance. So-called ‘barrier troops’ are still used widely by Russia. These units are stationed behind assaulting units, with the order to shoot any Russian trying to retreat. This and other ‘motivational methods’ are used on a great scale by the Russian army, a military culture unlikely to disappear anytime soon.
Russian vehicle reserves
With the reported vehicle losses by Russia in Ukraine being extraordinarily high, especially on combat critical systems such as (tube)artillery, this is one way Ukraine may hope to end the war. With in recent months an average of around 40 artillery pieces being lost daily, even Russian reserves are dwindling fast. Its industry does not stand a chance at keeping up with this rate of losses. At the current rate, serious problems could arise for Russia as early as 2025, as artillery is a critical piece of equipment to fight the modern war. Where Ukraine has the combined economies and industries of the West behind it, Russia can pretty much only count on North-Korea for such supplies. If Russia runs out of artillery pieces, or more likely reaches a level it does not want to drop below as it can threaten national security, it could mean an end to the war in Ukraine’s favor. It has to be said however, that for now Russian artillery still outnumbers their Ukrainian counterparts on the battlefield with a healthy margin.
Conclusion
After months of record high continuous losses for Russia, the nation shows no signs of letting up. As both sides are looking for answers on how to gain the upper hand in this war, newly developed weapons and tactics are fielded on the regular. Russia does not dictate the war as much as it did half a year ago, as Ukraine's front line situation drastically improved. The surprise attack on Russia itself has not only boosted Ukrainian morale, but has blasted right through many ‘red lines’ set by the Kremlin. Hope for Ukraine is now that they have shown the West that Putin’s red lines are no reason to fear escalation by Russia.