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Date: 14/02/2025
Location: Goma, North Kivu Province, DRC; Nyabibwe, South Kivu Province, DRC; Kalehe, South Kivu Province, DRC; Bukavu, South Kivu Province, DRC. Kinshasa, Kinshasa Province, DRC.
Ground Security:
For those in Goma and the Kivu Lake regions (North and South Kivu) in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC): pay extreme caution and try to relocate outside the country as soon as possible. The same applies to those in Kinshasa; pay extreme caution and leave the country as soon as possible. If you are unable to leave or have to stay in-country, stay indoors as much as possible and monitor local media for updates. Do not trust ceasefires at face value, especially unilaterally announced ones. If one is announced, monitor the news for updates and keep a cautious approach. Note: The Dutch embassy in Kinshasa is temporarily closed to the public. If in need of help, contact the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at +31 247 247 247.
Airport/Overflight Security:
Goma International Airport (GOM; FZNA) has been seized by M23, rendering Air Traffic Control (ATC) and Airfield Services unavailable. It is NOT possible to land/takeoff or divert to Goma International Airport. The airport and runways were damaged during the fighting. Thus, landing on Goma Airport runways should be avoided even in emergencies.
There are two NOTAMS issued related to FIR KINSHASA (FZZA):
United Kingdom (NOTAM EGTT V0046/24): it is recommended not to enter FIR KINSHASA (FZZA) within 100 NM of the eastern boundary, between the 1st parallel north and the 2nd parallel south, below FL250.
Canada (NOTAM CZUL H0401/25): it is recommended not to enter FIR KINSHASA (FZZA) below FL260.
This means that overflying traffic at higher altitudes is generally not at risk under normal operations. However, those descending or diverting below FL260 within FIR KINSHASA face significant exposure to small-arms fire and MANPADS. Therefore, it is recommended to take precautionary measures by planning the route, avoiding alternate airports in the DRC in case of an emergency, and maintaining an altitude above FL260 in FIR KINSHASA.
On 11/02/2025, the DRC prohibited any aircraft registered in Rwanda from overflying, landing or otherwise utilising Congolese airspace.
What happened?
On 25/01/2025, The DRC Armed Forces (Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo, hereafter FARDC) announced that the governor of North Kivu province, Maj. Gen. Peter Cirimwami Nkuba, was killed by an M23 sniper in Sake, close to the local frontline.
On Monday, 27/01/2025, March 23 Movement (Mouvement du 23 Mars, hereafter M23) fighters captured the eastern city of Goma, North Kivu Province, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), marking a significant escalation of the decades-long conflict which reignited in 2022.
M23 is one of several armed groups operating in eastern DRC, seeking control over mineral mines. The UN accused both Rwanda and Uganda of supporting M23 with claims of Rwandan and Ugandan troops present in eastern DRC.
On 28/01/2025, protesters demanding action against M23 attacked several embassies in Kinshasa, the DRC’s capital. The affected embassies are those of the United States, France, Belgium, Uganda, Rwanda, and Kenya, as well as the UN’s Permanent Mission of the DRC.
On Monday, 03/02/2025, M23 announced a unilateral ceasefire to start on Tuesday, 04/02/2025, citing "humanitarian reasons." However, on Wednesday, 05/02/2025, M23 violated the ceasefire and captured the town of Nyabibwe.
On 04/02/2025, Reuters reported that Uganda had sent 1,000 more soldiers to the east Congo, north of Goma. This deployment brings the total number of Ugandan soldiers in the region to an estimated 4,000 to 5,000. However, Uganda’s involvement extends beyond confronting the M23 rebel group. The troops are mainly supporting the Congolese government in addressing a separate security threat by pursuing militants of Ugandan origin with ties to the Islamic State group, suggesting that not all of these forces will be directly engaged in the fight against M23.
On 07/02/2025, The Guardian reported, citing diplomatic and high-ranking intelligence sources, that the Rwandan Defence Forces (RDF) have suffered hundreds of casualties since they began actively supporting M23 in 2022. The same report, citing UN experts, states that the RDF is in “de-facto control” of M23. Rwanda keeps denying that its forces have crossed into the DRC.
On 08/02/2025, the DRC and Rwanda signed an “immediate and unconditional ceasefire” agreement. The DRC also agreed to begin direct negotiations with M23. The DRC has previously refused to directly negotiate with M23 after designating them a terrorist group in January 2025.
On 09/02/2025, Reuters reported that at least 75 FARDC soldiers are to stand trial for desertion, looting and violence against civilians, including murder and rape. This incident points to
On 10/02/2025, Reuters reported that South Africa had added 700-800 soldiers to the garrison already present in DRC. South African troops in DRC are now believed to be around 2000 personnel strong.
On 11/02/2025, the DRC prohibited any aircraft registered in Rwanda from overflying, landing or otherwise utilising Congolese airspace.
On 12/02/2025, M23 captured Ihusi and Kalehe. M23 is swiftly approaching the capital of South Kivu province, Bukavu.
Analysis
The situation in eastern DRC is escalating rapidly. M23, which swiftly moved through the South Kivu province while still holding part of North Kivu Province (including its capital, Goma), is expected to reach and capture Bukavu, the South Kivu province’s capital. From there, M23 - a Tutsi-led group - is in the position to threaten the territory of Burundi, a Hutu-majority and Hutu-governed country.
M23’s advance has implications that go beyond the DRC. The ongoing military campaign is already arguably a regional conflict, and if M23 continues its advance, the region could plunge back into a cataclysm not seen since the wars that troubled the region during the 1990s. While M23’s current campaign evokes memories of the 2012 crisis, when the group briefly captured Goma, that escalation was swiftly contained. At the time, international pressure in the form of US and EU sanctions forced Rwanda to withdraw its vital support to M23, leading to the group’s retreat. Today, however, Rwanda is better placed to avoid sanctions, reinforcing its continuous support of M23.
Rwanda’s resilience to sanctions in 2025 likely has to do with several deals it currently has with Western countries. In February 2024, the EU signed a lucrative contract with Rwanda to import critical minerals and rare earth elements (REE) to reduce dependence on China. The EU also provided €40 million to support Rwandan forces in Mozambique, despite criticism from the DRC after the initial payment in 2022 coincided with M23 clashes. Beyond the EU, Rwanda’s global standing is reinforced by its significant international presence, ranking as the world’s second-largest and Africa’s largest contributor of personnel as of September 2024.
Uncoincidentally, the eastern DRC region, where M23 is advancing, is rich in the 3TG group of minerals, composed of tin, tantalum, titanium (3T), and gold (G). The UN has already accused Rwanda of plundering the DRC’s minerals. Besides the ethnic-based animosity behind the M23 campaign, the exploitation of 3TG deposits in eastern DRC is most likely the other driver for M23’s military campaign.
South Africa’s military intervention has been a reality check for South-African president Cyril Ramaphosa. The troops deployed to counter the M23 advance have failed to do so, highlighting the effects of the SA’s shrinking military budget.
Conclusion
The situation in eastern DRC is dire. Rwanda’s support of M23 is resilient, and the group’s advance does not appear to be slowing down. The group’s advance is getting dangerously close to the Burundian border. If the Tutsi-led M23 were to violate the Burundian border - a state with a social and political Hutu majority - the risk of reviving the ethnic-based conflict between Hutu and Tutsi would reach levels not seen in 30 years. Despite the DRC-Rwanda agreement on a ceasefire, M23 has kept its advance going, further undermining the swift and stable crisis resolution.