Search dyami insights

Date : 17/09/2024 Who’s involved : Parties: Israel, Hamas, Houthi, IRGC, Hezbollah  What happened? A military raid was launched by Israel in the occupied West Bank, including Jenin, on 28/08/2024 , involving hundreds of ground soldiers,  fighter jets and drones resulting in the arrests and deaths of several militants. On  31/08/2024 , the bodies of six Israeli hostages were found in the Gaza strip  by the IDF, retrieved from a tunnel under the city of Rafah. This recovery ignited days of protests against the Netanyahu  government telling him to forge a deal with Hamas on the release of the remaining hostages. On 02/09/2024  the United Kingdom suspended 30 out of 350 arms exports licenses to Israel , fearing that they could have been used in serious breaches of International humanitarian law.  Despite the Israeli protests on  02/09/2024 demanding a ceasefire, on 03/09/2024 Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu defined the control of the Philadelphi Corridor as a necessary part to reach a ceasefire agreement, and blamed Hamas for the stalling of the deal and the killing of the hostages  on 31/08/2024. On 05/09/2024,  Hamas affirmed not to be willing to agree on a new ceasefire deal for Gaza, since it had already accepted the U.S. proposal of July 2. Instead, it pressured Israel to accept the already existing one, and it accused Netanyau of using the Philadelphi corridor in southern Gaza as an excuse to thwart the deal and continue the violence against palestinians. On 06/09/2024,  the American-Turkish activist, Aysenur Eygi, was killed during a protest in the occupied West Bank  by an Israeli sniper. The IDF claims it was targeting another person at the protest who was carrying a molotov cocktail. An investigation is pending.  On 08/09/2024,  Israeli special forces attacked an Iranian missile production facility in Syria, destroying the site, and targeted a Syrian military headquarter. During the raid four IRGC commanders were captured and abducted by Israeli troops. On 11/09/2024 , the US government demanded an overhaul of Israeli military conduct in the occupied West Bank. On the same day, Israel launched several airstrikes on southern Lebanon, killing a senior Hezbollah commander. According to the Israeli defense minister Gallant,  the focus is shifting from Gaza to Lebanon. He is preparing the troops for a ground operation in the region. On 12/09/2024  Turkey opened an investigation into the death of the Turkish-American activist, and showed the willingness to request an international arrest warrant. On  15/09/2024,   a long-range ballistic missile was fired by the Iranian-backed Houthis. The missile hit central Israel and triggered air raid sirens in Tel Aviv and the Ben Gurion international airport. On 17/09/2024 , several members of the Israeli government announced that returning displaced Israeli citizens from the north back to their homes has first priority. The Netanyahu government believes that the only way for them to return home is when Hezbollah can no longer launch missiles and UAVs at the north from the south of Lebanon, implying that a military operation is on hand.   Analysis : The ongoing conflict and the long impasse on a peace deal between Israel and Hamas is causing turmoil amongst Israelis, who are pressuring the government to accept the ceasefire.  Hamas is reiterating its willingness to accept the already existing US proposal for a ceasefire with Israel, but Netanyahu is sticking to his conditions regarding the Philadelphi Corridor. The more time passes, the higher the likelihood of a decline in Netanyau’s political consensus.  If the hostilities with Hezbollah continue and escalate into a war, there is a possibility of further worsening of the internal political and social situation. The past months have seen an escalation of hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah. The attacks between the parties continue, and the IDF is getting ready to undergo military operations in Lebanon.  It is likely that this will lead to a ground war between Hezbollah and Israel in the southern part of the region, Beirut and the Bekaa Valley, which would all suffer a severe humanitarian crisis. The conflict will likely entail the intervention of Iran and its proxies, and would probably affect the current peace negotiation between Israel and Hamas, leading to other internal protests in Israel. The war would likely spread in all the neighboring countries like Lebanon, Syria and possibly Jordan and have severe economic, social and political consequences. Iranian influence in Israel's neighboring countries is widespread, and the involvement in the recent attacks against Israel makes the situation more unstable. The hostilities between Israel and Iran are escalating, and it is likely that the latter will use its relations with Syria and Hezbollah to play a pivotal role in the conflict.  Israel has been targeting Islamic Republican Guards Corps troops working in Syria through air strikes and raids by special forces. It is likely that Israel will continue to do this as the tensions with Hezbollah are increasing. Israel will target the weapons and advisors pipeline that comes from Iran into the Levant. Conclusion The war between Israel and Hamas may come to an end soon as Hamas has suffered severe losses and is ready to accept a ceasefire.  The Philadelphi corridor seems to constitute an obstacle in the negotiations, but Israel seems to be ready to end its major operations and focus on surgical attacks.. However, Iran and its proxies have ramped up their attacks on Israel from several different fronts , such as Yemen, Syria and Lebanon. It is likely that Israel will respond by targeting military facilities across the region where the IRGC has been training and arming Iranian proxies. Air strikes and special force incursions in Syria, Lebanon and Yemen are likely to continue the coming weeks, and a vast Israeli ground operation against Hezbollah in the south of Lebanon is now likely to happen.

Written by Jacob Dickinson The political revolution in Bangladesh on 5 August 2024 was a turning point in global politics. As the world’s eighth most populous country in the world, with a population of 173 million people, Bangladesh’s revolution marks a struggle for democracy in a region characterized by authoritarian politics. Termed the ‘Monsoon Revolution’ within Bangladesh, the student-led protests that took place in Dhaka throughout the summer evolved into mass demonstrations against Sheikh Hasina’s authoritarian rule when on the 5 August, she resigned and fled to India. The new interim prime minister Muhammad Yunus has attempted to provide order to the country. With a struggling economy, recurrent power cuts, and ensuring free and fair elections, the new government faces a host of challenges as it begins a transition to democracy. The change in Bangladesh’s politics also has profound implications for the geopolitics of South Asia, given the country’s geography. Bangladesh’s shares borders with India and Myanmar. As a mid-way between emerging India and Southeast Asia, any land link between these economic spaces must go through Bangladesh. The vast coastline is home to three out of the twelve ports facing the Bay of Bengal, making it a strategic hub for projecting power into the Bay. Given its importance geographically, Bangladesh is also caught in the regional rivalry between India and China. India is intensely suspicious of China’s expanding maritime ambitions in the Indian Ocean and strong ties with countries in India’s sphere of influence. While China does not see India as an immediate threat, China is also wary of India’s growing engagement with the US and sees the growing partnership as an attempt to contain China’s rise. What does Bangladesh’s ‘Monsoon Revolution’ mean for Bangladesh’s position in South Asia’s geopolitics? Monsoon Revolution The events that Bangladesh has experienced since the beginning of August 2024 caught everyone by surprise. Sheikh Hasina, daughter of the leader of Bangladesh's independence war in 1971, had held on to power since 2009. Her Awami League increasingly took control of state apparatus in the police force and forged fake election   results in 2014, 2019 and 2024. Reports of electoral manipulation and imprisoning opposition figures in the rival Bangladesh National Party (BNP) were widespread and her rule seemed impenetrable.  Yet by August 2024,  the authoritarian state erected by Sheikh Hasina fell in a matter of days . After months of student-led protests over a quota system in June 2024 in Dhaka, the authorities violently cracked down on the largely peaceful demonstrators. Hundreds of protesters were killed and reports of the torture of students by security forces took Bangladesh's society to the streets as they called for the ruling PM Sheikh Hasina’s resignation. Splits emerged within the military and police  factions as it became clear that the protests could not be stopped. On 5 August, protesters stormed her presidential palace and ransacked the building. Sheikh Hasina resigned and fled to New Delhi, India, where she remains. While she has applied for asylum in UAE and the UK for safety, they have so far refused extradition calls. The new government quickly came to power with Muhammad Yunus , a Nobel prize winning economist, as the new acceptable head of government . He released political opponents of Sheikh Hasina, including the leader of one of Bangladesh’s main political parties, the Bangladesh National Party (BNP), and scheduled new elections to be held within 90 days. He also pledged to remove the Awami League’s hold over state institutions, firing police chiefs and other members of the state apparatus. Amid reports emerging  of violence targeting members of the Awami League following Hasina’s resignation, he quickly called for calm and a stop to vigilante violence as he pledged a transition to a new democratic government.   India’s wrong-footed strategy  India saw the removal of Sheikh Hasina as an acute setback for India’s security, trade and possible loss of regional influence in South Asia. India backed Sheikh Hasina throughout her time in power. This was a historical commitment, as India backed her father’s war for independence when it separated from West Pakistan. In talks over new infrastructure deals, she chose Indian companies instead of Chinese companies, resolved some territorial conflicts with India and claimed to clamp down on armed ethnic groups using Bangladesh as a base to attack India’s unstable Manipur region.   The removal of Sheikh Hasina will likely lead to tensions between Bangladesh and India. The International Crime Tribunal in Bangladesh has taken steps to extradite  Sheikh Hasina from India and called for Sheikh Hasina to be held to account, which India has so far refused. Bangladesh will remember that India firmly backed the ousted Sheikh Hasina and her party, the Awami League, while she manipulated elections and arrested opposition-leaders. Moreover, Indian Prime Minister Modi’s acutely anti-Muslim rhetoric has led to considerable criticism within Bangladesh. India has not forged  closer ties with the popular opposition party, the Bangladesh National Party (BNP), which is confident that it will win the next general election planned in November 2024. India is therefore intensely suspicious of what comes next in Bangladesh. External Minister Jaishankar did not rule out the suspicion that ‘outside forces’ played a role in ousting Sheikh Hasina, pointing to the suspicion of India toward the Pakistan-China relationship. India feels that it is being encircled  by an emerging China in South Asia with its infrastructure policies and emerging military capabilities in the Indian Ocean. There are also signs that India’s foreign policy is not working. India’s formerly close partners are turning away. The Maldives’ newly elected president, Mohamed Muizzu, asked the Indian military stationed in the country to leave in May 2024. Nepal’s new prime minister Khadga Prasad Sharma Oli led to new agreements with China to establish a new infrastructure deal. If new elections are held in Bangladesh, India believes it could lose influence to China too.   China’s strategic gain? China has not taken a side in the aftermath of Bangladesh’s revolution. After Sheikh Hasina resigned at the beginning of August 2024, China’s nationalist Global Times newspaper stated that China “hopes that social stability will be restored soon”. However, China’s diplomatic core has since sought to take the initiative. A Chinese foreign service spokesman said  that “we want to further develop the all-round strategic partnership with the new government in Bangladesh’. This puts China potentially at an advantage diplomatically for the new government as it does not hold on to the former Sheikh Hasina.  Despite Sheikh Hasina’s close ties with India, she cultivated close ties with China too. Bangladesh joined China’s vast overseas infrastructure-based project the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013 and built several seaports, railway tracks and powerplants. Up to 70% of the weapons for the Bangladeshi military were bought from China, including tanks, missiles and other weapons. China and Bangladesh announced joint military exercises held in May 2024, to the intense opposition of India’s foreign policy establishment.  China’s ties with Bangladesh could deepen in the future. The probable victory of the next election in Bangladesh, the BNP, could look more toward China to fulfill its infrastructure and development needs over India. But the relationship is not without its issues. Bangladesh’s finance ministry has also warned that China’s investment deals and excessive borrowing have led to ‘debt-traps’, citing Sri Lanka’s default in 2022 as evidence. In negotiations earlier in 2024, Sheikh Hasina’s visit to the country did not result in many new infrastructure deals or an agreement to buy more goods from Bangladesh. Whether China is willing or able to capitalize on its diplomatic opportunity is still uncertain.  Looking Forward Bangladesh’s transition to democracy will be challenging. Attempts at achieving justice for families killed and persecuted for years by the security services. At the same time, Bangladesh’s geopolitical position embroils it in the larger geopolitical competition for regional dominance between China and India  in South Asia. With India seemingly protecting Sheikh Hasina from extradition to face a trial in Bangladesh, ties between the two are likely to worsen. India’s government may distrust and dismiss Bangladesh’s next government as moving toward China. While there is a hope that this is the first step in a democratic transition, Bangladesh will find itself stuck between a rock and a hard place.

Date:   11/09/2024 Where : Afghanistan Who’s involved : Taliban, International airlines, other aircraft operators What happened? Since the taking of power by the Taliban in Afghanistan, most aviation operators have been avoiding the airspace over the country (except airway P/G500). Recently, some countries such as Canada and the Netherlands are starting to overfly the country with a minimum altitude restriction in place of FL320 . This routing can save a significant amount of time when flying between Europe and Asia, compared to alternatives.  Analysis : As far as it is known, the Taliban and other militant groups in Afghanistan do not have the capability, and to some extent the intent, to target overflying aircraft at cruise altitudes. Airlines and other operators, however, must consider the consequences if problems on board challenge the ability or choice to stay at cruising altitude. When entering the airspace below FL320, an aircraft will quickly descend into the range of anti-air weapons present in the country. The shoulder fired anti-air missiles (MANPADS) in the country are largely able to reach FL150 , due to range augmentation by the high altitude of much of the country’s territory. ‘Perfect’ circumstances will allow for ranges reaching FL200 over the majority of the central part of the country .  Mechanical issues: Obvious reasons for aircraft to descend, or commit to a full emergency landing stem from mechanical issues. For example, a loss of cabin pressure will force an aircraft to descend well within the range of MANPADS  as explained above. Other issues that can force an aircraft to land will make a flight very likely land in Afghanistan considering the size of the country. This presents the challenge of not just getting pax and crew out, but also eventually the aircraft itself.  Medical issues: An easily overlooked perspective is if medical problems occur with either crew or pax on board of an aircraft over Afghanistan.  Deciding to land in Afghanistan does not only bring an aircraft in range of the many weapons in the country, but it also does not guarantee the necessary medical care and services to those who need it. This would also mean the aircraft and all of its crew and pax are now on ground in Taliban-led Afghanistan . The alternative –not landing– can also be a difficult decision that falls on the pilot(s). In, for example, the scenario where one of the pilots becomes incapacitated, the colleague(s) sitting next to them is/are now in charge of the difficult decision to attempt to find rescue in the country or to continue flying, possibly sealing the fate  of the colleague. Similarly, there is also the cabin crew and all of the pax who can have medical issues.  Conclusion : While operating over Afghanistan under normal circumstances is secure, the situation can quickly escalate as soon as anything out of the ordinary happens during the flight. Consequences of both mechanical and medical events should be strongly considered when deciding to operate over Afghanistan. Besides the presented security issues in this document, safety and ethical issues exist about operating over the country. The country has no ATC and the money paid to gain overflight rights goes to the Taliban, which is a terrorist organization that severely restricts freedoms and violates the rights of its citizens, especially women.

September 2024 India is the world’s largest democracy and one of the world’s fastest-growing economies, making it an attractive destination for Dutch entrepreneurs. With its young workforce, expanding middle class, and evolving business landscape, India offers significant opportunities. The Netherlands is already a key investor in India, and the relationship between the two countries is set to strengthen in the future. While China remains a global manufacturing hub, rising geopolitical tensions and costs have led many companies to shift operations to India. India's vast market, particularly in rural areas and tier 2 cities, presents Dutch companies with opportunities to make a significant impact on millions of lives. However, Dutch entrepreneurs face challenges in India, including navigating a complex political climate, language barriers, and significant cultural differences that affect business practices.  India’s efforts to attract foreign business Doing business in India requires time and effort in order to understand its diverse and segmented market, which closely resembles Europe's variety of national markets, each with specific needs and regulations. By co-designing our services with Indian experts in the political, legal and economic realms, Dutch businesses can effectively tailor their offerings to local demands. Indian politics and its challenges for foreign business India's political environment presents a complex landscape for foreign businesses due to its multi-party system and the significant influence of state-level politics on business regulations. India’s federal structure of governance, where states have substantial autonomy over various sectors, contributes to the complex business environment. The success of foreign investments in sectors like renewable energy, agriculture, health, and water management depends heavily on understanding and adapting to these political and legislative dynamics. Renewable Energy  In India, while sectors like Renewable Energy and Agriculture allow 100% Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), navigating the diverse regulatory landscape across states can be challenging. For example, states like Tamil Nadu and Gujarat offer different incentives for solar energy projects, leading to a lack of uniformity in approvals, land acquisition policies, and tariff structures. Political shifts and regional regulations often introduce additional layers of complexity.  Agriculture  In Agriculture, despite open FDI in areas like food processing, political opposition and public protests can disrupt operations and lead to policy reversals. One example is the extensive farmers protests that took place in 2020-2021 against agricultural reforms proposed by the national government. The months of negotiation caused uncertainty for foreign businesses looking to invest in the country. A good awareness of the political importance of agriculture is vital for those looking to invest in the sector.  Water Management Water management in India is also influenced by political shifts, with states controlling water resources and varying regulations based on their focus (agriculture, industry, or urban development). State-level political parties often tailor their water management policies to the needs of their voter base, resulting in policy changes when power shifts occur. Similarly, sectors like Space Exploration and Defense require high-level government approvals for FDI, tying investments to the political climate and key political relationships. Recent relaxations in FDI rules, such as allowing up to 74% FDI in defense under the default route, reflect India's gradual openness but also emphasize alignment with government priorities. India’s security challenges  As well as the constantly shifting policy in key sectors, there are also security concerns for doing business in India. With India being such a diverse country and a major player on the regional and global playing field, there are some security concerns that need to be considered when doing business there. Political risk Political risk is an ongoing concern in India In recent years the Indian political system has shown changes that are taking the country away from its democratic principles. Prime Minister Modi has, through his politics and decrees, shown that he wants the future of the country to be one with more emphasis on Hindu Nationalism. The BJP’s propaganda often blames economic or societal problems on minority religions, increasing repression of the Muslim community in particular. Taking into consideration the closely intertwined political-business fields, political developments are highly relevant for entrepreneurs in India.  Protests and activism are a common phenomenon in India, varying in degree of disruption and inconvenience. For example, protests across India began after a sexual violence crime in West Bengal on August 9, 2024. Health workers and politicians, some seeking political gain, have driven the demonstrations, which have been met with teargas and water cannons. Sexual violence remains a major issue in India, and the protests have disrupted healthcare services, affecting thousands of patients nationwide.  Espionage risk Due to India’s economic and international political significance, corporate and other forms of espionage have become an additional risk for visiting businesspeople. Access to WiFi networks, spyware, phishing and other forms of electronic surveillance such as the Aadhaar biometric ID system, increase government tracking capabilities. India’s booming military industry has also become a target for foreign spy agencies to obtain blueprints and other information from businesses in the defense industry. India and (inter)national tensions India’s national security is also not a stranger to conflict. As a continent-sized country with a diverse population, there are several independence movements across the country. The BJP’s focus on Hindu nationalism further intensifies the decades long tension between India and Pakistan, both of which have large armies and nuclear capabilities. In the northern Kashmir region, forces are known to use violence against Indian government representatives and threaten national security. Additionally, India has accused Pakistan of actively recruiting local Kashmiris to act as militants, further escalating tensions in the region. These regions and their militias are not likely to soften, nor do they seem willing to sign cease fire or peace agreements with the Indian government.  India-China tensions  India and China also vie for dominance in South Asia and Southeast Asia, and their rivalry has led to military confrontations, most notably the Galwan Valley clash in June 2020. This violent skirmish, which occurred along the disputed Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the Himalayas, resulted in casualties on both sides—the first deadly conflict between India and China in over 40 years. The clash heightened tensions and led to a significant military buildup along the border. There is a rising risk of India being drawn into a conflict if China faces off with the Philippines, as India supports the Philippines against Chinese naval incursions. India is, in that sense, in a difficult political and geographical position, surrounded by potential escalating conflicts. Cultural differences  To operate successfully in a new foreign environment requires appropriate preparation. Familiarizing yourself with local norms and values is a prerequisite for transitioning smoothly onto the foreign market you are trying to enter. Being prepared for India’s cultural diversity will lead to better decision making within the country. Language  Not being able to read or understand Hindi can lead to risks that could be easily avoided if you work with somebody who can translate relevant information and interpret it in a way that applies to you. Although English is widely spoken in India and commonly accepted as a language for corporate communication, much of what goes on in daily life, the news and local events can be overlooked when you are not familiar with the local language. Business culture  Learning about Indian cultural differences also plays a significant role in determining your future success in India. Understanding how a hierarchy works within your Indian partnering company team, for example, can minimize the possibility of unnecessary conflicts arising.  Knowing the appropriate gestures (anjali mudra, putting your hands together to greet), forms of address (sir or ma’am) and key phrases (namaste or namaskār) on the other hand leave a positive impression, which is a critical factor for successful business interactions, gaining trust and building a reliable network.   Looking forward It is essential that Dutch entrepreneurs wishing to enter the Indian market are thoroughly informed about the changing policy environment, security situation and cultural sensitivities in the region they are operating in. Taking proactive steps to protect their business and enforce CSR standards are necessary to minimize risks and maintain operational continuity. Dyami in partnership with Vyuh Consulting helps to identify these risks. With a good understanding of the opportunities and safety concerns, Dutch entrepreneurs can make the most of the opportunities of India while ensuring their operations remain secure. About Vyuh Consulting Inspired by the Sanskrit word "Vyuh," which signifies strategy, Vyuh Consulting  is a dedicated team of professionals with over a decade of experience in election management, branding, and strategic advisory. The firm specializes in crafting custom campaigns, offering strategic insights, and delivering in-depth political intelligence. With a broad network across India, Vyuh Consulting leverages its deep understanding of the country's diverse political landscape to provide actionable solutions. The firm's mission is to guide clients through political challenges, helping shape a more informed and effective future for India.

Written by Arianna Lucà, Jacob Dickinson, Mark Bruno, Kevin Heller, Sara Frisan  Russia-Ukraine : As Ukraine invades Russia, operationalizes F-16s and domestically develops weapons to hit targets within Russia, Moscow is advancing on Pokrovsk.  Israel:   With the recovery of six hostages who were killed by Hamas, Netanyahu feels the pressure from inside and out to strike a deal with Hamas.  Myanmar: Arakan Army gains control of Rakhine State and resistance forces gain more territory as humanitarian crisis deepens. Sudan:   As Sudanese army boycotts U.S.-led peace talks, no end in sight to Sudan conflict. Libya:  The two main rivaling groups in Libya are both mobilizing forces and calling on militias to join their side in the run up to the October 2024 general elections.  Turkey: As Turkey continues to conduct lethal airstrikes in a cross-borders counter-terrorism campaign, it attempts to improve relations with Iraq and Syria. Burkina Faso: Unprecedented deadly attack in Burkina Faso shows military junta's struggles to combat rampant extremist violence. Indonesia: Proposed electoral law is canceled after thousands protests in Jakarta. DRC: Ceasefire with M23 fails as fighting resumes in eastern DRC. Venezuela:  As the crackdown on protests continues, the Maduro government issues an arrest warrant for the opposition leader.  Haiti: As Haiti is rocked by gang violence, the slow progress of the MSS raises concerns about the effectiveness of the UN-backed mission. China-Philippines: Coast guard vessel confrontation over another island in the South China Sea, the Sabina Shoal. Conflicts, August 2024 Russia-Ukraine In August 2024, the conflict between Russia and Ukraine saw a significant development, with Ukraine invading Russia . The surprise i ncursion into the Kursk region resulted in over 1200 km2 captured by the Ukrainian Armed Forces and hundreds if not thousands of Russian soldiers taken as POWs. Being Putin's latest 'red line' crossed, even this direct invasion of Russian soil has not triggered any of the escalation scenarios feared by the Western leaders . Ukraine publicly stated it has no long-term plans to keep Russian soil under its control; however, the defensive works put in place indicate it will not give it back without a fight. For now, Ukraine is still on the advance in the region , likely looking to take the Russian soldiers caught in the cut-off and surrounded area between Ukraine and the Seym River out of the fight.  On the other side of the spectrum and the conflict lies the Donetsk region ,  where the Russian Armed Forces have concentrated their offensive efforts . With their eyes set on Pokrovsk, the Russian Armed Forces are slowly but steadily making their way to the city. In a movement that worried many analysts about a potential breakthrough, fighting will likely arrive in Pokrovsk within the coming month . A town comparable in size to Bakhmut, the question is whether the world will see a repeat of the meat grinder that was Bakhmut. Russia took around six months to take that city, losing an exorbitant amount of manpower.  Airstrikes between the two nations are only escalating as the war continues,  with Russia recently launching its biggest aerial attack since the start of the full-scale war. This attack also gave the recently arrived F-16s their official baptism of fire, as they were used to fend off the incoming attack. One F-16 was lost  in this operation, which was claimed to have been an accident. Much about this is unclear for now, with claims from Ukraine that there was no case of pilot error.  As permission to engage targets with donated weapons inside Russia was not granted by (all) western countries, Ukraine sees more and more domestically developed long-range weapons on a regular basis. Their latest product is a new ' rocket drone ' which is meant to attack Russian targets well beyond its borders. Being a multitude faster than any of the current drones Ukraine uses to attack Russia at the moment, the success rate of this new weapon is likely to be higher. The war continues with no clear future victor in sight . Weapon developments continue steadily , both to outdo their opponent or to fill gaps left by supporting countries.  Israel The conflict between Israel and Hamas is still ongoing. Hamas and Israel have both agreed to return to the negotiation table to talk about a ceasefire in Gaza and to talk about the release of the Israeli hostages , of which 100 are still believed to be in the hands of Hamas. With the recovery of the bodies of six hostages who were killed by Hamas, the pressure on Netanyahu to reach a peace agreement with Hamas is growing . The United States, Europe, and the Arab countries all call on Netanyahu to reach a deal as soon as possible so the last hostages can be released. Meanwhile,   Israeli citizens have taken to the streets to demand a hostage deal as quickly as possible. However,  the right-wing parties and commanders in the IDF are convinced that Hamas is close to being completely defeated  and are very reluctant to sit down for a peace agreement, as a peace deal could give Hamas time to replenish resources and recruit new troops. Israel has been conducting military operations in Gaza aimed at denying Hamas recuperation since August 2024 by destroying their weapon caches, tunnels, and several headquarters.  Hamas has not been able to launch any significant attacks on Israel  or Israeli forces, and the ceasefire negotiations are likely to be the only means for Hamas to be able to survive the coming months. After the targeted assassinations of Hamas leader Haniyeh in Tehran and Hezbollah commander Shukr in Beirut on July 30 , both Iran and Hezbollah have threatened to retaliate against Israel. On August 25, the Israeli Air Force sent 100 fighter jets into Lebanon to  destroy over 1000 Hezbollah missile installations  in a pre-emptive strike as intelligence showed Hezbollah was preparing to launch hundreds, if not thousands, of missiles, rockets and UAVs into Israel. In response to the pre-emptive strike, Hezbollah managed to launch over 400 missiles and UAVs into Israel, which were either intercepted by Israeli air defense systems or did minimal damage to the countryside. According to several United States intelligence services, Iran is still willing to strike at Israel, but it is unclear why there is a delay in the execution of the plan. The pressure put on Iran by the US is likely to be a significant factor. At the same time, Iran is undergoing an intensive audit of its security forces as it seems that valuable information has been leaked to Israeli intelligence services  on the strengths of Iran’s weapons programs and the whereabouts of high-ranking Iranian, Palestinian, and Lebanese leaders and commanders. The coming months will show whether or not any of the involved parties in the conflict are willing to agree to a ceasefire or that the conflict will continue and perhaps escalate even further. It is clear, however, that Israel will not easily submit to ceasefire negotiations now that it feels it is winning the war against Hamas and it has such a grip on the movements of Iran and Hezbollah. The pressure from the US on all parties is likely to keep the region from completely falling apart into a regional war , especially since most Arab states have shown reluctance to support Iran, Hezbollah, or Hamas recently and are making various forms of business treaties and agreements with Israel. Myanmar The Myanmar civil war is ongoing. The resistance groups against the military junta have taken wrested control from the military in Shan, Kayah, and the Kachin State . The Arakan Army (AA) has taken most of the central and northern parts of the Rakhine State, on the border with Bangladesh, and has taken numerous important cities previously held by the military. There are reports of  widespread human rights abuses against Rohingya Muslims  from the military junta’s forced conscription to the AA’s attacks on civilians. The intense fighting between AA forces and the military  and airstrikes against civilian areas has led to a humanitarian crisis as hundreds of thousands flee. The UN said that the food aid being supplied to civilians has also been prevented from entering the state, with over 600,000 civilians at risk of starvation .  In mid-August  the government announced that certain civilians will be allowed to carry weapons  as the resistance forces approach the country’s second largest city, Mandalay. After the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) captured Lashio, a major military operations center in the northeastern Shan State, the military has been attempting to shore up further support from China. The  TNLA’s seizure of a Chinese-owned nickel mine has threatened China’s economic interests  and the ability of the military junta to control its interests in the country. The Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi met with the US, Thailand and the UN to discuss the issue at the same time as launching live-fire military exercises on the border with Myanmar.  The military junta’s loss of control in key areas  as well as the ineffectiveness of deadly airstrikes has led to more delays in its proposed elections. The National Unity Government, the main opposition coordinating the resistance forces, has called the next elections as a sham . While the majority of the country as well as western governments will see the elections as illegitimate, for China and other regional actors, this is seen as an opening to some kind of political settlement. Yet the challenges faced by the military and the progress of the armed groups suggest that the civil war is likely to continue in the coming months .  Sudan In August 2024, the  US-brokered peace talks  to resolve the ongoing Sudan conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF). were held in Geneva. However, neither of the warring parties showed up . Although the RSF delegation was present in Geneva, it boycotted the negotiations. Sudan's de facto governor, army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, decided not to attend the talks in Switzerland following RSF's continued armed and drone attacks in the country. The talks in Geneva proceeded despite the absence of the SAF delegation. While the negotiations did not result in a cessation of hostilities or steps toward ending the conflict, some progress was made regarding access to humanitarian aid . The warring parties agreed to reopen the Adre border crossing from Chad, which is connected to the Darfur region, and the Dabbah road from Port Sudan.  Despite the non-attendance in Geneva, the SAF sent a delegation to Jeddah to meet with U.S. mediators in early August and announced its presence at a meeting in Cairo to discuss humanitarian assistance with the US and Egypt.  As peace talks stall, the  humanitarian crisis in Sudan continues to worsen . According to a UN report released in early August,  over half a million people in Sudan are living in famine  and nearly 27 million are experiencing acute hunger. Moreover, armed violence and clashes between RSF and the army , as well as attacks targeting civilians persist in the country. On August 17, at least 85 people were killed in the central  province of Sennar during a paramilitary attack on the village of Galgani. RSF attacks persist in North Darfur, an area recently affected by massive floods. At least 30 people were  killed in early August during an attack on El Fasher, capital of North Darfur. In the last few weeks, extensive Sudanese army airstrikes have been reported in the region. On September 1, at least 10 people were killed and over 40 wounded in airstrikes in the city of Mellit in North Darfur.  Alerts, August 2024 Libya On August 9, the UN mission in Libya, UNSMIL, warned of a  possible new conflict   in the already war-torn Libya . The country has been run by two rival governments since 2014. The Western government, the Government of National Accord, is supported by the UN and the EU. In contrast, the eastern government, called the Libyan National Army, receives support from various sources, including Iran, Russia, and some Arab and sub-saharan states.  The Libyan National Army, run by former warlord Khalifa Haftar, feels it has the right to run more of Libya and has been desperate to take control of strategically important cities. Haftar's forces, led by his son Saddam, have attacked Tripoli in 2019 in an attempt to take control of the entire country. The attack failed, and a peace deal was signed in 2020.  Since the end of July and the beginning of August 2024, Haftar has been mobilizing his forces  again and has called for the help of other local tribes and clans to join his forces. In response,  the Government of National Accord mobilized its forces  and called on other clans and militias to strengthen its forces. The fragile peace in Libya has not been under this much pressure for years, and several observers and analysts fear that a renewed conflict is unavoidable . The recent arrival of a large merchant vessel in one of the Haftar-controlled harbors is believed to be under the authority of the Russian government. Some believe that Russia has just delivered a new set of weapons for Haftar in his bid to take control of Libya. The appointment of a new president of the National Bank on August 15   has not helped calm the situation down, as both parties feel the other is trying to gain control over the economy. In response, the Libyan National Army has shut down oil production in its areas of control. As an OPEC member this provision could affect the international price of crude oil. Oil workers in the harbors of Libya have said that they are continuing to fill oil tankers up and have not heard anything about the reported shutdown. The coming weeks will prove whether or not Haftar is truly intent on gaining more control over cities, airports, and harbors. The reaction of the international community  will determine whether or not such a move will turn into a full-blown war. Turkey This summer has seen a number of developments in the conflict between Turkey and the various Kurdish independence movements , broadly referred to as the Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK). Turkey considers all of the groups that fall under this umbrella as affiliated with the insurgent Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) , which is internationally recognized as a terrorist organization. Despite any differences in motivation, national origin, or objective, all of these groups are considered terrorists by Erdoğan’s government, and have been targeted in various military operations that have taken place not only in southern Turkey, but outside national borders in Iraq and Syria. The Turkish state has pushed this campaign as a broader anti-terrorism effort  that it has contributed to against ISIS and other IS affiliates. Turkey’s mixed strategic priorities in the region have complicated its relationships with several allies. Particularly, Turkey has been at odds with the United States and Iraq, who support various parties within the KCK  (though not the PKK). Developments in Turkish campaigns have gone largely underreported due to the unfolding regional conflict centered on Israel. In   attempts to improve relations with Iraq and the Assad regime in Syria, Turkey and Iraq have developed a new military cooperation pact . Part of this has included a promise to hand control of a Nineveh-province airbase back to Iraq’s Army. At the same time, the Syrian regime has declared that it will no longer demand that Turkish troops leave the country , as both governments discuss re-normalizing their relationship. It should be noted that both the Turkish and Syrian governments have fought various elements of the KCK, even as all three factions have been at war with ISIS. This could be indicative of further positioning of both militaries against the PYD/YPG, who are allied with the United States. As well, the normalization may be part of an attempt to re-home Syrian refugees staying in Turkey , who have recently faced increased persecution and political pressure since the beginning of the year. Turkish airstrikes into Iraq have continued , with an August 23rd strike into Iraqi Kurdistan, controlled by other KCK affiliates, killing three people, and another on September 2nd, killing twenty. The second strike was claimed by the Turkish government as being against purely PKK targets with no civilian casualties. That same day, a former PKK operative and Turkish citizen was sentenced to four years and three months of prison in Germany on terrorism charges. On September 3, two US marines were attacked by a group of fifteen assailants in the port city of Izmir. The attackers were members of the Turkish Youth Union, an extreme nationalist group. Both marines were returned to their unit uninjured and the assailants arrested. Burkina Faso On August 25, 2024, an unprecedented armed attack by the Jama'a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin group (JNIM) , an Al Qaeda affiliate in West Africa, killed more than 200 people and injured at least a hundred. The strike occurred in the village of Barsalogho, located about 80 kilometers north of the capital, Ouagadougou, near the strategic town of Kaia. Despite Al Qaeda-linked JNIM's claim that the victims were militia affiliated with the Burkina Faso army, local sources report that most of the victims were instead civilians. Since 2015, Burkina Faso has suffered regular armed attacks by jihadist groups  in a conflict that has claimed more than 20,000 lives. The military government, which lacks control over vast areas of the country, especially near the porous borders with Mali and Niger, has strengthened its partnership with the Russian government  in recent months to secure support in the fight against extremist terrorist attacks.  In July 2024, the military juntas of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger created a confederation called the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) , formalizing their exit from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and distancing themselves from Western partners. Although the new alliance promises to effectively combat extremist terror and militia attacks in the region, the rapid spread of violent extremist organizations, including the al-Qaeda-linked Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), is alarming. After the exit from the ECOWAS bloc  and the withdrawal of all Western forces from the three countries, which are among the most affected by the Islamic groups' violence, international observers and ECOWAS leaders fear a spillover of jihadist groups into neighboring countries. Following the late August attack, the UN called on the Burkina Faso government to re-engage with the international community  and the ECOWS to ensure security and obtain support  in combating the rise of extremism in the region.  While extremist violence rages, Burkina Faso is experiencing a severe humanitarian crisis,  with more than 6 million people in need of humanitarian assistance and food insecurity. The government is tightening its authoritarian grip on the population , increasingly restricting freedoms and rights in the name of "national security." The political isolation of the AES military juntas makes hopes for democratic government restoration in the region unrealistic.  Indonesia People in Indonesia’s capital Jakarta have protested   against a government attempt to reverse a ruling by Indonesia’s top court on August 22 . This ruling determined that parties do not need a minimum of 20% of the vote in their regional assemblies as a prerequisite for fielding a candidate. While most of the protests in Jakarta  remain peaceful, some protesters tried to breach the gates of the Indonesian House of Representatives. Police fired tear gas and water cannons. Protests also took place in the cities Yogyakarta, Bandung, Surabaya, and Makassar on August 23. These protests focussed on outgoing president Jokowi’s attempts to prolong his political influence  through installing his sons to positions in Indonesia’s political system. Eventually, it was stated by the deputy speaker that  the revision of the regional election law would not be implemented  on August 22. It is unclear whether the government will try to implement the revisions again in the future, but worries in Indonesia about Jokowi's increase of political influence are growing . Jokowi changed the constitutional age limits to allow his son to run for vice president in the 2024 general elections. Tensions have risen after the protests on August 22 and August 23 and future political maneuvers by Jokowi and his government could lead to more protests in the near future.  Updates, August 2024 Democratic Republic of Congo Despite signing an Angola-brokered ceasefire between the Congolese government and Rwanda , which came into effect on August 4, clashes in eastern DRC North Kivu intensified in late August 2024. Heavy fighting renewed between Congolese forces and the M23 rebel group near the densely populated areas of Lake Edward and Lake Kivu. It was reported that Rwanda-backed M23 had made a significant advance , taking control on August 25 of the eastern town of Kirumba. On August 28, M23 accused the Congolese army for the first time of violating the ceasefire, claiming that Kinshasa-backed rebels, such as the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) and Wazalendo militias, but also international forces, including those of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), were violating the ceasefire. The  fragile ceasefire was also undermined by rising tensions between the DRC and Rwanda governments , which peaked after Rwanda President Kagame criticized Congolese President Tshisekedi on August 11 for failing to address the deteriorating security situation in the region. The DRC announced that it will sue Rwanda in the East African Court of Justice  on September 26 over charges of violating its sovereignty, committing atrocities against civilians, and violating international law with its involvement in the conflict and support for the M23.  While the resumption of clashes threatens to worsen the  humanitarian crisis  in the country, the DRC is also facing the rapid spread of the Mpox epidemic . Although Mpox is endemic in 11 provinces in the DRC, the number of cases has been rising sharply over the past two years. Between January and August 2024, more than 16,000 suspected cases were reported in almost all 26 provinces. Displaced people and people affected by the conflict are particularly at risk. Humanitarian aid and vaccines are delayed.  Venezuela Political and social unrest  continues to grip Venezuela following the contested presidential election on July 28. On August 22, the Venezuelan Supreme Court (TSJ) confirmed President Maduro's victory , a ruling that is final and has sparked widespread condemnation both internationally and regionally. The TSJ also accused opposition candidate Edmundo González of attempted electoral fraud and inciting violence alongside opposition leader María Corina Machado. Both González and Machado went into hiding. However, Machado resurfaced on August 28 to join the  latest protests against Maduro in Caracas . In a recent interview, she asserted that the opposition has a strong strategy, emphasizing that coordinated internal and external efforts, including peaceful protests and international pressure, still hold the potential to unseat President Maduro. On September 2, Venezuela's attorney general's office confirmed that a court had issued an arrest warrant for opposition leader Edmundo González , accusing him of conspiracy and other crimes against Maduro's government.  Since the election, anti-government protests have resulted in at least 23 deaths, nearly 200 injuries, and over 2,400 arrests . Amid the deepening crisis,   the government has escalated its crackdown by imposing tighter restrictions on NGOs and forcing over 100 state employees at the state oil company PDVSA to resign for opposing Maduro. The Venezuelan military has pledged loyalty to Maduro , who has increasingly relied on security forces to maintain his hold on power. Diosdado Cabello, a hardline ruling party leader, has been appointed as interior minister with control over the police forces, raising fears of an intensified crackdown on dissent. International pressure on the Maduro government persists . On September 2, the US seized Venezuela's presidential airplane in the Dominican Republic, allegedly purchased in violation of sanctions. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights urged Venezuelan authorities to end actions that instill terror in the population. However, the crisis shows no signs of abating,  and further protests are expected as tensions continue to escalate. Haiti Anti-gang operations in Haiti are progressing slowly , two months after the arrival of the first Kenyan police forces. Currently, 400 Kenyan soldiers are deployed out of the 2,500 planned, and concerns are mounting over the effectiveness of the UN-backed Kenya-led Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission aimed at assisting Haitian police in restoring security. While the Kenyan forces have successfully reclaimed infrastructural sites in Port-au-Prince, including the airport and the largest hospital, challenges persist. In late July 2024, Kenyan troops conducted an operation in Ganthier, a town east of Port-au-Prince that had fallen under gang control. However, the operation saw limited success as gang members fled before the security forces arrived, only to retake the town after the Kenyan and Haitian police withdrew. Moreover, the MSS strategies are not clear, and there is  limited involvement of Haitian police  and authorities in the operations, undermining the credibility and effectiveness of the mission. Reports of inadequate equipment for the MSS forces have prompted the U.S. military to announce, on August 24, the delivery of additional armored vehicles and equipment to enhance operational effectiveness during joint missions with Haitian police. To strengthen the military corps in fighting gangs, the  Haitian army has opened a recruitment campaign inciting citizens to enlist for national security. At least 3,000 candidates have already been selected. For many young people, in most cases unemployed and without job opportunities, the chance to become a soldier is particularly attractive. On August 19,  Haitian police used tear gas to disperse hundreds of peaceful protesters in Port-au-Prince  who were demanding more decisive action against   gang violence, frustrated by the recent failures of law enforcement. These protests occurred just days after a new prison breakout in Saint-Marc, central Haiti, the third such incident this year. Eleven suspected escapees were killed in shootouts with police, and one was recaptured. Haiti continues to grapple with severe challenges , including persistent gang violence and domestic political turmoil, with the interim council facing accusations of corruption. China-Philippines Tensions in the South China Sea calmed somewhat after an agreement between China and the Philippines allowed the Philippines ship in the Second Thomas Shoal to be resupplied with food and water. However, in late August, the Philippines and China claimed that both sides had rammed coast guard vessels near another disputed island in the South China Sea.  The Sabina Shoal, located 120 km from the Philippines and 1,000km away from mainland China, is emerging as the latest flashpoint between the two sides. The US responded by backing its treaty ally, the Philippines , and criticized China’s actions in the region. The Chinese defense ministry has repeatedly claimed that the US is pushing the Philippines to provoke China and damaging regional security. The international response has become more of a factor in the South China Sea. The Philippines and Vietnam signed a significant defense cooperation agreement i n late-August as both sides share concern over the growing assertiveness and claims in the South China Sea. Vietnam has also been constructing islands in its exclusive economic zone to control parts under threat from China in the South China Sea. However, the new collaboration reflects a recognition that it has to work with the Philippines. The competing claims over many of the islands in  the South China Sea will continue to be a point of tension in the coming months.  About the authors  Arianna Lucà Arianna is an intern at Dyami, covering the role of Research Intelligence Analyst to enrich her background knowledge in International Relations with topics involving security and conflict. She holds an MA in International Relations from Leiden University and an LLM in European Criminal Justice from Utrecht University. During her academic career, she volunteered for different NGOs, mainly Amnesty International, and Emergency and ActionAid, embracing humanitarian and conflict security causes, and addressing issues like famine and lack of security in different regions of the world. With Dyami, she is contributing to joint publications, writing articles, and keeping up to date with key regional developments. Jacob Dickinson  Jacob studied Global Political Economy at Leiden University. He is passionate about international development and is looking to expand his expertise in geopolitics and crisis management. Curious about other cultures, he has traveled in Europe and Asia for both academic study and professional purposes. His expertise includes the geopolitics of oil and industrial upgrading in the electronics global value chain. He is particularly interested in the evolving political and economic relationships between China and ASEAN, and the consequences for regional development and security.  Kevin Heller Kevin has over a decade of experience in the world of counter-terrorism as a consultant, trainer, and analyst. His background is in military Close Quarter Battle/Combat and Krav Maga for Military and Law Enforcement agencies. As a Global Intelligence Analyst, he writes Intel Briefs on conflict zones and terrorism.He has extensive knowledge of conflicts, politics, and other events happening in the Middle East. Kevin also has a background in Journalism and International Affairs/Conflict Studies. Mark Bruno Mark is a former noncommissioned officer in the US Army whose experiences and education have led him to a career as a cybersecurity and conflict analyst. His background in cyber and electronic warfare, combat medicine, open source intelligence, and information operations, have helped provide valuable insight to the Dyami team, where he now serves as the Information Security Officer. Sara Frisan  Sara works at Dyami as a Geopolitical Intelligence Analyst, leveraging her background in Peace and Conflict Studies. Sara joined Dyami after completing her MA in Conflict Studies and Human Rights at Utrecht University and held an MA degree in International Sciences and Peace Studies. During her academic career, she conducted research in South America, primarily Colombia, on the dynamics of collaboration and resistance between civilians and non-state armed groups in violent settings. In her previous internship at the investigative think-tank InSight Crime, Sara developed some expertise on transnational organized crime and political-criminal alliances.

Date:  02/09/2024 Where :  France Who’s involved :   Pavel Durov (Telegram CEO/Founder) French Authorities The broader intelligence community What happened? Pavel Durov , the founder and CEO of the social media and messaging platform, Telegram , is currently facing significant legal challenges in France.  Durov  was initially detained at Le Bourget Airport near Paris on August 24, 2024 . On August 28, 2024 , he was formally charged with several serious offenses, including complicity in illegal activities facilitated through Telegram . The specific charges against Durov  include: Complicity in Managing an Online Platform for Illegal Activities:  This includes accusations that Telegram has been used to facilitate the distribution of child sexual abuse material and drug trafficking. Refusal to Comply with Legal Requests:   Durov  has been charged with refusing to share information or documents with French authorities when required by law, which is seen as obstructing justice. Money Laundering:  This charge relates to allegations that Telegram has been involved in financial transactions that may have violated money laundering regulations. Criminal Association:  This charge suggests that Durov  is being implicated in a broader network of criminal activities facilitated through the platform. Providing Cryptology Services Without Prior Declaration:   Durov  is also charged with offering encryption services through Telegram without adhering to the necessary legal declarations required by French law. He is required to remain in France and posted a €5 million bail under the condition that he must report to a police station twice a week. The case has been highly controversial throughout multiple domains of the security industry , and has led to discourse of mixed productivity, but also a massive spread of misinformation and disinformation. Telegram  is utilized heavily by criminal elements, law enforcement, military personnel, and investigators in most security fields. Analysis Telegram is a messaging service that functions very similarly to WhatsApp, with a greater emphasis on users being able to broadcast announcements to publicly visible channels. It is globally the third most popular of such services, just behind Facebook Messenger, with nearly 1 billion users.  Telegram is extremely popular in eastern Europe. It has arguably become the most important line of communication between the public and combatants in Ukraine. Telegram  distinguishes itself by having an option to engage in “secret chats” that are allegedly end-to-end encrypted while still using the same account as one’s broadcast channel. This means that the Telegram  service itself is not supposed to be able to see what’s discussed between users in “secret chats”. WhatsApp , Facebook Messenger , and Signal  have this option enabled by default in Europe . Telegram   does not have end-to-end encryption enabled by default. Being able to pivot from these private chats to public channels is part of the appeal for groups that want to maintain a level of privacy while still attracting a public audience. This is why Telegram is the preferred messaging service for criminal and paramilitary organizations. Intelligence professionals routinely monitor Telegram , as it offers unique insight into military , criminal , and extremist  activity. Competitor, Signal ,  is strictly end-to-end encrypted , and therefore cannot be found criminally liable in similar situations. Concerns have been raised that this could be threatened based on precedent set during Durov ’s upcoming trial. The arrest has prompted an extremely strong backlash within the intelligence and security communities, with many in favor of Durov ’s arrest, and others decrying it as a point of major privacy and civil liberties concern. Others are cautious of threats to Telegram ’s existence, as it would remove a major primary intelligence source. Some defenders of Durov  argue that his arrest could set a dangerous precedent where platform operators are held criminally responsible for user-generated content, potentially stifling freedom of expression by forcing platforms to over-censor to avoid liability. This argument has been taken up by Elon Musk , whose own platform, X, was recently banned in Brazil for related reasons. Many of the arguments have ignored the fact that the evidence being presented by the French government have come from the unencrypted public chat rooms  hosted by various threat actors. Under current regulations in most EU countries, these are not protected, and are subject to cooperation by the platform owner, as they can access the unencrypted information. Telegram has refused its opportunity to join the Child Sexual Abuse Material (CSAM) reporting agreement known as the Tech Coalition. It’s a subset of the WePROTECT Global Alliance, which includes platform owners Google, Microsoft, Meta (Facebook, WhatsApp), X corp (Twitter), Apple, Amazon, Snap Inc. (Snapchat), TikTok, and LinkedIn. Durov’s rights since his arrest have also curiously been championed by the Russian government, who Durov, himself has been fleeing since 2014. In 2018, Russia attempted to block Telegram after Durov refused to comply with demands to hand over encryption keys. Despite the ban, Telegram continued to function in Russia due to the platform’s use of various technical workarounds, and the ban was unexpectedly lifted in 2020. Durov has publicly stated that no concessions had been made to the government. Conclusion Despite the concerns voiced by the intelligence and security communities,  Pavel Durov ’s situation is grounded in serious allegations that, for the time being, don’t have to put the government’s actions at odds with privacy rights or the legality of end-to-end encryption. While Durov ’s stated stance regarding the management of Telegram  is one of “privacy first”, it’s also led to accusations of negligence, particularly in not taking adequate measures to prevent the misuse of the platform for criminal purposes. The French government’s actions appear to be legally justified under current laws, particularly concerning unencrypted public channels. The bigger civil rights question demanded of this case is whether or not platform owners should be liable for what is posted on their platform. If the cases go to trial, it will be crucial to watch for its potential influence on other platforms and the broader tech landscape.

Written by Paula Boden Indonesia faces severe hazards such as rising sea levels, extreme heat, and natural disasters. As a reaction, the Indonesian government has initiated mega-development projects, such as relocating the capital from Jakarta to Nusantara. However, these governance strategies are not always effective, especially for the least privileged. This, in turn, leads to radical Islamist and hard-line religious-conservative groups exploiting and utilizing the situational distress caused by climate change to infiltrate and recruit people for their cause. The risk of linked climate change/rising radicalism extends beyond Indonesia, likely affecting the broader ASEAN region. Consequently, for effective (inter)national and also regional cooperation, climate change needs to be recognized as an underlying risk for rising radicalism to successfully integrate preventive action into counter-radicalism strategies. Introduction Extreme heat, mass floods, tsunamis, and volcanic eruptions in Indonesia cause an increase of mental stress, physical loss of homes and more deaths to come. Indonesia is facing an unprecedented catastrophe on multiple levels due to climate change. The link between climate change and (in)security has already been the focus of several investigations. Especially in the case of Indonesia, rising sea levels and extreme heat put the population at high risk of food and water scarcity, displacement, and weakening economic stability. Considering that hidden insecurities related to climate change such as mental distress and anxiety are added to the physical disappearance of land and homes, climate change can fuel the rise of religious radicalism.  With the President-elect Prabowo taking office in October 2024, the potential rise of hard-line religious radicalism in Indonesia needs to be considered more seriously. Prabowo, a former lieutenant general and in 2014 Jokowi’s presidential opponent, is feared to align with radical groups due to his past associations with religious hardliners.  The Islamic puritanism movement Hizbut-Tahrir Indonesia  (HTI) uses climate-linked narratives to take advantage of grievances of people who are affected by climate change challenges. By picking up climate change in their Islamic-radical propaganda, HTI is successful in improving their ideological standing mostly in climate change-prone regions.  Indonesia’s current situation and its climate change challenges Indonesia is the world's fourth most populous nation, with 275.5 million inhabitants and home to the third largest surviving area of tropical rainforests. The country is highly vulnerable to climate change impacts and is listed  as the 47th country most at risk of climate change hazard (out of 191). Main climate change risks posed to Indonesia's population are  extreme heat stress, pollution, rapidly reducing water supplies, and food insecurity. The natural hazards hitting Indonesia are earthquakes, floods, tsunamis, cyclones, volcanic eruptions, and droughts. There have been several governmental attempts to tackle climate change-related security issues. As a political reaction to the sinking capital Jakarta, President Joko Widodo announced several mega-development projects to tackle climate change. Widodo started relocating the capital to the new IbuKota Nusantara (Capital of the Archipelago) to Borneo island, building a completely new green Eco-Forest City from scratch. The estimated costs of the project lead up to US$45 billion. Nusantara is currently being built on more than 250,000 hectares of forest – around three times the size of Jakarta. Still, in comparison to the 10 million Jakartian citizens, the new capital will only initially host 500,000 citizens. The first relocation deadline for 1,800 civil servants for the new seat of government is in August 2024.  The current national strategy is called ‘2045 Golden Indonesia’ and marks Indonesia’s proclaimed independence from Dutch colonial rule on August 17, 1945. By this, Widodo follows a political stance of progress and development. He aims to showcase the rise of a middle-income nation to a high-income country resilient to climate change challenges. However, it is questionable to what extent Widodo’s mega-development visions will leverage effective climate protection. Especially after the national election early in 2024, environmentalists fear that the decade of deforestation that took place under Widodo could unleash a new ecological catastrophe of mining, coal burning, downstreaming, and deforestation. Further loss of forest will have serious impacts on climate change, not only in Indonesia but worldwide. Deforestation will be associated with more frequent droughts, massive heat waves, and severe sea level rise. This is a high risk, especially in Indonesia, where most of the population lives in coastal areas. NASA Earth Observatory images by Michala Garrison, 2022 & 2024 Wikimedia Commons Indonesia is home to 50 to 70 million Indigenous people, which make up 18 to 25 percent of the total population. Deforestation, large-scale nickel mining, resource competition and tensions over land are a continuous threat to Indigenous people and their well-being. The construction of the new capital now exacerbates these social inequalities and abuses against Indigenous peoples. The Indonesian government offered small compensation if Indigenous communities were to relocate. However, several reported cases of human rights violations show that Indigenous people are being forcefully displaced and are under threat of losing their homes.  Such issues may be exacerbated once President-elect Prabowo Subianto will take office in October 2024. Activists and opposition fear further democratic backsliding. Human rights groups claim that Prabowo was involved in human rights violations in Timor-Leste in the late 1980s. Even though he confirmed to follow Widodo’s democratization efforts and development plans, Prabowo military background and his controversial past suggest that he might take a more centralized and controlled governmental stance.  His appointment would further increase the military’s involvement in domestic political affairs. There is also a chance for recurring political connections between religious Islamist hard-liners and Prabowo's government. Prabowo has past associations with hard-line Islamist groups. In the lead-up to the 2019 election, he appeared to be forming a populist-military-Islamist alliance. During this period, his allies allegedly played a key role in organizing mass protests against Jakarta’s Governor Basuki Purnama (known as Ahok), targeting him for his ethnicity and alleged blasphemy. These protests were led by Islamist groups such as Front Pembela Islam  (FPI) – who call for violent jihad. Indonesia’s standing in ASEAN region and internationally Indonesia is the largest economy in Southeast Asia and a crucial player in peace and security issues in the region. Regarding climate change, current research highlights that four ASEAN member states are among the world’s highest committers of perpetuating global warming while also experiencing and facing the harshest climate change-related hazards and impacts. In Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam, extreme heat is considered the most extreme physical risk.  On the international stage, Indonesia will likely continue to play an active role under President-elect Prabowo. Indonesia’s government is likely to present itself as the most green, sustainable and high-tech country in Southeast Asia. Officially, Indonesia already launched an Energy Compact and thereby joined a global community of member states who commit to the SDG7 and strong net-zero goals. Initially these goals were set to be reached until 2030 In more current speeches, Widodo set climate goals to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 32% below the business-as-usual by 2060.  Indonesia’s political challenge of radical Islamist groups Indonesia’s counter-terrorism strategies have been partly successful in the past. As a reaction to the 2003 Bali Bombings, the counter-terrorism Special Detachment 88 or Densus 88 was formed. Densus 88 was equipped and trained by the US and Australia. In 2006, a Transnational Crime and Terrorism Task Force was established by the Indonesian Attorney General’s Office. Another national accomplishment was the creation of Indonesia’s Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT) in 2010.  The focus of Indonesian deradicalization programs was to ensure that those under arrest did not re-engage with radical Islamist groups once they were released. Additionally, Indonesia has opened four prisons for high-risk terrorists. These major political activities against the violent Islamist discourse and against activism calling for a violent jihad have forced the radical religious-conservative Islamist groups to shift towards implementing the shari’a from grassroots and activist level.  Radical Islamist and religious-conservative groups have gained influence over politics since the late 2000s by organizing grassroot campaigns and charities as well as by forming a political party. In the Indonesian People’s Da’wah Party the terrorist organization Jamaah Islamiyah  (JI) operated through its disguise. Up to 7,000 members work within government institutions and are spread across civil and religious organizations. Extremist Islamist groups in Indonesia have benefited from weak public institutions, consequently also building religious-oriented schools called Pesantren as well as instilling young people on social media. In 2022, Indonesia’s National Counter-Terrorism Agency (BNPT) revealed that 68 Pesantren are affiliated with JI. However, looking at the total estimated number of 30,000 Pesantrens in Indonesia, it’s important to note that the majority of Pesantrens, as the oldest educational institution rooted in Indonesia’s Muslim communities, carry the spirit of religious moderation promoting tolerant views of Islam.  Radicalism on the rise due to climate change? Members and former activists of HTI support a climate narrative that legitimizes and supports a global caliphate. Figures show that young Indonesians perceive the climate crisis as a fundamental threat to their personal and national security. The majority of respondents of a national survey  in 2021 (81%) think Indonesia must protect and preserve the environment even though it will slow down economic growth. Another 84% of respondents agree that action on climate change/crisis must be carried out immediately. The study shows that 52% are very concerned about environmental degradation, while 32% are very concerned about Islamist radicalism in politics. So, even though young Indonesians fear Islamist radicalism, talking about the most pressing environmental concerns seems to be working: by considering climate change in their Islamist-radical propaganda, HTI is successful in improving their ideological standing mostly in climate change-prone regions. The Islamist involvement in politics from grassroot levels is not a new phenomenon – especially in Indonesia, extremist groups and sympathizers have set up decentralized charities. This way radical religious-conservative groups manage to infiltrate and propagate their radical visions without using violence or openly denouncing democratic governance. The misuse of charities and support mechanisms for their own hard-line religious cause is just another way of influencing the Indonesian youth and people affected by climate change.   With the President-elect Prabowo taking office in October 2024, the potential rise of hard-line religious radicalism in Indonesia needs to be considered more seriously. It is a possibility that radical Islamist groups will utilize the mega-development projects – issued by Widodo – which apparently only support already privileged Indonesian/ Nusantara citizens in their progress and development goals.  Due to the fact that the new capital Nusantara will not be able to host all 10 million Jakarta’s citizens, radical Islamist groups could get involved in relocation efforts for Jakartan citizens who are more underprivileged and disregarded by the government.  As the map shows below, locations for known radical Islamist groups and their grassroots level engagement are mainly based on Java island – which is mostly affected by climate change-related hazards. The map also highlights that the locations of Cirebon, Indramayu, Karawang, Bandung, and Tasikmalaya on West Java are quite close to Jakarta and, therefore, similarly at risk from extreme climate change challenges.  The infrastructure for radical Islamist engagement and activities already exists in West Java. On the one hand, this makes it easier from the outset for already active Islamist groups to convince vulnerable people and those threatened by climate change with their ideology and shari’a-based climate change narratives. On the other hand, it paves the way for new radical developments and hard-line religious-conservative groups to gain new members and radically exploit the grieving situations of helpless residents in West Java, Indonesia.   Map made by  Paula Boden Now, particularly with the new government under Prabowo, these tendencies towards Islamist radicalism are feared by Democrats and moderates across Indonesia. One scenario could be that Prabowo’s formerly close ties to hardline Islamists will be reactivated and revived. This would only worsen climate change challenges in Indonesia while fuelling Islamist activities in disaster response. But Prabowo himself projects a more moderate image for his presidency, not least through his social media appearance on TikTok as ‘ cuddly grandpa ’ during the election campaigns. Prabowo taking office in October 2024 has therefore the power and tools to pave the way for positive political turnarounds: such as tackling tendencies towards radical Islamist movements at an early or at least still developing stage through engaging in preventive climate change action. This would make it more likely that Prabowo turns his back on solidifying with radical political parties and groups for good and engages more with his country’s agreement towards international climate change combat such as committing towards SDG 7  and regional cooperation of counter-radicalism.  Change could be achieved through more inclusive development projects that not only benefit the 500,000 citizens of Nusantara but all societal segments, including Indigenous communities and socially disadvantaged people in West Java. So, extensive preventive governmental action under Prabowo that recognizes a link between climate change and the rise of radicalism could lead to effective (inter)national counter-radicalism and counter-terrorism strategies.    Conclusion Climate change is the one underlying risk for multiple security threats in Indonesia, where the population faces life-threatening climate-related risks and is simultaneously influenced by radical Islamist groups and their misuse of Islamic views. Climate change is not only a risk multiplier but an underlying risk for increased radicalism, especially in West Java. Vulnerabilities posed by climate change-related hazards are exacerbated. The underlying risks of climate change also represent and incorporate a potential opportunity for Indonesia’s national and international standing. Through extensive preventive action, Indonesia, under President-elect Prabowo, could incorporate climate resilience and protection into counter-radicalism strategies to depict potential radical Islamist activities at an early stage. Additionally, by proactively addressing climate change challenges to simultaneously mitigate radicalism, the Indonesian government could collaborate with regional partners in ASEAN and could further manifest its progressive standing internationally. This approach would, for example, include a more inclusive stance on development that benefits all social layers and their economic and basic needs. Thereby, it would reduce the pool of potential recruits for radical Islamist and hard-line religious-conservative groups. Profile Paula Boden is a Freelance Journalist with a main focus on migration and climate crisis. She has years of professional experience in political education and Project Management. Currently, she pursues her MSc degree in Security Risk Management at the University of Copenhagen where she specializes in OSINT-research and Intelligence.

Date:   September 2024 - February 2025 Who is involved:  Ukraine, Russia, US, EU, Iran, North Korea, China In this report: What has been happening? Expectations Conclusions What has been happening?  In order to get an understanding of where the war is likely going, it is important to look at the major events and factors that have happened and influenced the war in the past months.  Battlefield Russia In a surprise turn of events, Ukraine invaded Russia on the 6th of August. The Russian military’s poorly prepared, lightly manned defenses on its Kursk region border were overrun without much of a struggle. Many conscripts posted on these positions were captured in great numbers, further discussed below. Russia’s response to set up a proper defense with professional military units has been slow, and a significant portion of the units initially responding to the invasion were destroyed in ambushes on their way to the battlefield. Reportedly over 1250km2 of the Kursk region has been captured by Ukraine at the time of writing. Speculation on Ukraine's intent is to not maintain a hold over (all) the acquired  territory. There are several signs of Ukrainian armed forces constructing defensive works in Russia, suggesting they are planning to hold on to at least some of the gained grounds, or at least make it a costly operation for the Russians to bring the territory back under Russian control.  POW galore The opening week of the Ukrainian invasion into Russia saw a record number of Prisoners Of War (POWs) taken. In one incident, over 100 POWs were captured in one go. Many of these new prisoners are Russian conscripts, a group normally not directly exposed to war raging in Ukraine. The capturing of these conscripts in great numbers raised concern amongst the civilian population in Russia, as their family members before were not directly exposed to the risk of dying or getting captured in combat. Ukraine stated proudly that all the POWs taken will be used for the ‘POW exchange fund’, in a move to secure the release of Ukrainian prisoners, many still from the battle of Mariupol now more than two years ago.  Eastern front The Russian Armed Forces are slowly but steadily crawling forward on the eastern front line. Now approaching the vicinity of some key towns and cities, battles on this front are not expected to reduce. These advances have been extremely costly for the Russian forces, both in manpower as in equipment. It however seems that as long as the slow crawl forward continues, the Russian Armed Forces command is not planning on giving up on offensive operations despite the cost that comes with it.  Southern front The southern front has seen the littlest movement of the three. This does not mean combat is not conducted however. Most notable is the surrender of Krynky, the small foothold held by the Ukrainian Armed Forces on the left bank (Eastern bank) of the Dnipro river. After months of fighting over the small bridgehead, which mainly served a symbolic function, the terrain and town were demolished to such an extent that there was hardly any cover left.  Ukrainian domestic (weapon) developments Ukraine is setting up and increasing its domestic weapon production. Cheap drone variants are being made en masse, not just by the Ukrainian military industrial complex, but also by people from their homes and soldiers near the front lines. On the other end of the spectrum is the new “drone rocket” ‘Паляниця/Palyanitsya’, a weapon resembling a cruise missile in its manner of attack. The Palyanitsya is likely developed partially because of the lack of permission from the US to use their donated ATACMS missiles against targets deep inside Russia. The Palyanitsya has a reported range of around 500 km, placing military airfields previously deemed safe, well within targeting range. Besides fully domestic developed weapons, European companies are setting up production facilities in Ukraine. Rheinmetall will set up shop to produce tanks (likely the Leopard 2) and air defense systems and munitions for these systems. Norwegian company Nammo recently allowed the production of their developed artillery ammunition in Ukraine. The relatively scarcely delivered CV90 Infantry Fighting Vehicle will reportedly be produced in Ukraine itself in the future as well, with modifications allowing the vehicle to perform better on the terrain type of Ukraine, as this was the only ‘complaint’ the Ukrainian armed forces have of the vehicle. Besides this, many more CV90s will be produced for Ukraine in Sweden, the country which developed the vehicle.  Producing additional weapon systems and munition to bolster supplies for the front line is not the only motivation for Ukraine to establish domestic production. At the moment, Ukraine heavily leans on the West, and the US in particular, to supply the country with enough weapons and munitions to fight off Russia. Historically, the West has not provided indefinite support to any nation or group it was helping, usually leading to the demise of said nations or groups. Not wanting the same fate, it serves Ukraine well to be able to at least primarily rely on its domestic production. This also will eventually negate the long waiting times for supplies to arrive, when production is up and running.  Attacks on energy/military  infrastructure  Ukraine continued its successful campaign against Russian military and energy infrastructure. When referring to energy, it consists mostly of oil and fuel facilities, which support the Russian war machine. In recent months, one could even consider this campaign as escalated, as Ukrainian strikes on Russian soil are an almost daily occurrence by now. While not all attacks are successful, some of the ones that are, are very high profile. Such as the recent strike against the oil/fuel storage in Proletarsk, which at the time of writing has been burning for more than a week. Other strikes have reached into Russia over 1700 km beyond the original borders.  Foreign support for Russia North Korea showed a great amount of support for Russia. Beyond the known ammunition support by North-Korea earlier this year, North-Korean vehicles were sighted fighting in Ukraine. These have a unique design, making them stand apart from the vehicles in use by Russia. Specifically, these Bulsae 3 or 4 are tank hunting vehicles. Constructed on modified BTR-60 or 80 platforms, they are equipped with ‘TV-missiles’. Capable of destroying targets ~10km away, this vehicle is likely very effective in combination with the plentiful small scale drones active on the frontline. Reasons for North Korea to donate vehicles does not necessarily indicate a shortage in the Russian supplies. A likely explanation is that North Korea sees the donation of some of its vehicles as a good way to test how these would fare in a real world combat scenario, while improving relations with Russia. Foreign support for Ukraine After the US eventually approved its bill (Ukraine Security Supplemental Appropriations Act, 17/04/2024) including the aid package for Ukraine, the situation on the front lines quickly saw a drastic improvement for Ukraine. Shortly followed by the limited approval by western countries to use donated weapon systems directly on or against Russian territory. This again noticeably improved the situation for Ukraine, as it was finally able to take out at least some of the positions in Russia threatening cities like Kharkiv. The limits stated by some nations, including the US, however do still significantly limit Ukraine’s striking ability against Russia.  A big development in western support for Ukraine is the arrival and deployment of the long awaited F-16s. While for now only a small first batch of around six are active over Ukraine, this number will crawl up to over 60. This alone will not turn the course of the war, nevertheless they are expected to be a valuable asset for Ukraine. In fact, during the mass missile/drone attack on 26/08/2024, F-16s were used to intercept incoming munitions. The F-16’s flight characteristics makes it a very suitable aircraft for these types of operations. Both Denmark and the Netherlands allow Ukraine to use their donated F-16s directly against and over Russia, whereas Belgium has not given this approval.  Crimea The peninsula is still a hotspot for military activity. This comes mostly down to aerial attacks or naval Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USV). While no direct attempt for the peninsula by Ukraine is expected anytime soon, Russian military and logistical targets are under heavy duress on Crimea. While the Russian Kerch bridge has recently not seen a(n attempted) strike, the alternative train-ferries have been destroyed in recent months. Naval activity by Russia on Crimea is almost completely over, with most ships withdrawn to Russia. Air defense systems on the island are frequent targets for Ukrainian aerial attacks, costing Russia many resources to maintain a formidable defense on the peninsula.  Black Sea Due to the retreat of most of the Russian Black Sea fleet, the Black Sea saw a reduction of activity, albeit not a total absence. Ukraine managed the sinking of some ships, including a submarine that was only recently in the water again after being damaged almost one year ago.  Expectations  Russian winter focus As the winter makes combined arms operations difficult in Ukraine, Russia is likely to switch back to its aerial attack focus, as it did last winter. It might try to continue its forward grind, or the Russian Armed Forces will bunker down in anticipation of a Ukrainian counter offensive. If the Russian territory taken by Ukraine is not recaptured by Russia, it is highly likely that Russia will focus on reestablishing its control over these areas, even if the weather does not suit offensive operations well.  Ukrainian winter focus It is hard to tell if the Ukrainian Armed Forces are planning any offensive operations this coming winter. While the winter will bring the ‘muddy season’ making combined operations difficult, Ukraine has surprised many with some of its actions and achievements in the past months. Not many people, if any, expected Ukraine to directly invade Russia itself, so anything is possible coming winter. What however is likely, is that Ukraine will expand on its air campaign, which has been growing both in quality and quantity over the past months. More use of the Palyanitsya is almost certain, and as the F-16s are drip fed into the country, it is likely Ukraine will regain (some) control over its own airspace. This does not only go for countering Russian aircraft threatening Ukraine, but also in intercepting UAVs and missiles. The use of F-16s in an aggressive role is unlikely, as this raises the risk of losses substantially.  Developments in the West As Europe is moving ever so slowly towards being able to stand on its own legs, both defensively as in supporting Ukraine, all eyes are on the US. The coming election season could have a major impact on Ukraine and the support it can expect from the US. If Kamala Harris wins the election, not much change is to be expected. The biggest question is what happens if Donald Trump is elected again. In the past, Trump announced that he would stop all aid to Ukraine, and “stop the war within 24 hours”. However, after a meeting with Polish president Duda earlier this year, Trump’s and the Republican party’s opinion on the subject was (at least temporarily) adjusted. The way Trump and the Republican party will approach the subject is something which has to be seen after the elections.  Most European countries are investing heavily into their militaries. However, as is the case with democracies and bureaucracies, developments are slower than expected and hoped. On the other hand, once the proverbial steam train is rolling, it is expected expansion of military power and production will grow exponentially. This will eventually allow Europe to carry more weight in supporting Ukraine, if not all of it, if the US decides to fully drop support to Ukraine.  “Every army is always perfectly prepared to fight the previous war”. Western armies generally are fully oriented around fighting a counter terrorism/insurgency conflict after around twenty years of fighting the Global War On Terror. Armies will have to shift their doctrine again to fighting a peer or near-peer level conflict, to prepare for the worst case scenario of the Ukraine war escalating to a NATO-Russia level conflict. The war in Ukraine is watched closely by military leaders in the West exactly because of this. As an example, the Polish army has been seen training in trench warfare, a tactic once thought belonging to history which fully resurfaced in Ukraine.  Assessment on Russia While large open discontent amongst the Russian population comes up every now and then, with the most recent example being Kursk region inhabitants. Voices of discontent in Russia usually are upset with the way the Kremlin is fighting the war, and not that it is being fought at all. This for now leaves the option of Russia halting its war due to internal pressure, by for example upset family members due to the loss of their relative, outside of the realm of possibilities.  The equipment used by the average Russian soldier has improved over what it was a year ago. (Real) body armor and helmets are more prevalent, and soldiers are seen more and more wearing the same type of camouflage as well as combat boots instead of sneakers. Storm-Z and other such units made up of criminals are less prevalent on the front line. This indicates a shift in Russian effectiveness on the battlefield, although its losses are still staggering partially due to its continuous aggressive stance. So-called ‘barrier troops’ are still used widely by Russia. These units are stationed behind assaulting units, with the order to shoot any Russian trying to retreat. This and other ‘motivational methods’ are used on a great scale by the Russian army, a military culture unlikely to disappear anytime soon. Russian vehicle  reserves With the reported vehicle losses by Russia in Ukraine being extraordinarily high, especially on combat critical systems such as (tube)artillery, this is one way Ukraine may hope to end the war. With in recent months an average of around 40 artillery pieces being lost daily, even Russian reserves are dwindling fast. Its industry does not stand a chance at keeping up with this rate of losses. At the current rate, serious problems could arise for Russia as early as 2025, as artillery is a critical piece of equipment to fight the modern war. Where Ukraine has the combined economies and industries of the West behind it, Russia can pretty much only count on North-Korea for such supplies. If Russia runs out of artillery pieces, or more likely reaches a level it does not want to drop below as it can threaten national security, it could mean an end to the war in Ukraine’s favor. It has to be said however, that for now Russian artillery still outnumbers their Ukrainian counterparts on the battlefield with a healthy margin. Conclusion After months of record high continuous losses for Russia, the nation shows no signs of letting up. As both sides are looking for answers on how to gain the upper hand in this war, newly developed weapons and tactics are fielded on the regular. Russia does not dictate the war as much as it did half a year ago, as Ukraine's front line situation drastically improved. The surprise attack on Russia itself has not only boosted Ukrainian morale, but has blasted right through many ‘red lines’ set by the Kremlin. Hope for Ukraine is now that they have shown the West that Putin’s red lines are no reason to fear escalation by Russia.

Date :  29/08/2024 Who’s involved : Government of National Accord, Libyan National Army, militias, clans, OPEC, the United Nations, foreign actors with personal interests What happened? On 23/07/2024  the Government of National Accord mobilized troops and militias and deployed them closer to the border with Libyan National Army controlled areas in the south-west of the country. This move alarmed the Algerian armed forces since the Libyan forces were getting very close to its borders. On 09/08/2024 the Libyan National Army, under control by General Haftar and his son Saddam, mobilized its forces and called on militias, clan and other armed groups to join them in a move directed towards the west of the country.  In response to this mobilization the Government of National Accord called for its own mobilization of armed forces and militias. On 10/08/2024  the United Nations called on the two parties to demobilize their forces and to stay on the road of the peace agreements that had been reached in 2020.  The European Union followed suit. In response to the UN’s declaration and the mobilization of troops by the Government of National Accord, General Haftar claimed on  13/08/2024   he was only mobilizing his forces to battle drug smugglers and human traffickers on the borders of his regions. On 14/08/2024  the Government of National Accord tried to replace the President of the Central Bank with a person that would be more representative of national interests. The Government of National Accord claimed that the current president of the Central Bank is too much in favor of giving money to areas controlled by the Libyan National Army.  These areas are filled with oil fields that pump out millions of gallons of oil for the international oil market. In response to the replacement of the president of the Central Bank, Haftar decided to shut down oil production on 22/08/2024 and in this way put pressure on the Government of National Accord to not try and replace the president. The shutdown of oil fields in an OPEC country like Libya can have international consequences, but so far has not led to any major price changes. It is reported that the transport of oil from the harbors to the international oil tankers is ongoing without pause.  According to the Libyan National Army however the production of thousands of barrels a day has been halted. Earlier in August 2024  a large Russian Navy vessel was seen in a harbor controlled by the Libyan National Army. Intelligence suggests that Russia has delivered more weapons to Haftar and his forces in order for him to be more powerful to take on the western government. Haftar’s forces may control large parts of the country, including the oil fields, but they lack connection to an international airport or larger harbors that they need to achieve the status of a more legitimate international partner.  Meanwhile, Russia, the UAE, Egypt and several other African and Arab countries continue to support Haftar with weapons, troops and intelligence. Libya, under the guidance of the United Nations, has planned general elections across the country in October 2024 . These elections have been postponed many times and it is uncertain whether or not they will take place in an atmosphere of heightened tensions.   Analysis : According to the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), the situation in Libya has not been this tense since 2020.  A peace agreement between the Libyan National Army and the Government of National Accord was reached after the second civil war that had lasted from 2015 to 2019. Both sides agreed to form a government and reach agreements on for example holding general elections and running the economy.. However, since the peace agreement there has not been much of a change in attitude towards each other in Libya. Both sides are vying for power and control over major hubs and resources in the country.  It is likely that both parties will try to gain the upper hand in the run up to the elections so they can solidify their possession of major assets.   Both parties might try to sabotage elections as a measure to increase their foothold over important assets. Foreign powers, like Russia, the UAE and Egypt, in the past sent thousands of troops to aid the Libyan National Army in its struggle for power in the hopes of being the first in line to benefit from the large oil fields in Libya. Even though, according to the 2020 peace agreement, foreign troops are no longer allowed in the country, it is very likely that foreign actors are still supplying weapons, intelligence and other forms of support to the Libyan National Army.  If the elections in October 2024 do not pan out in favor of the Libyan National Army there is a chance that foreign powers will once again advise general Haftar to seek confrontation with the Government of National Accord in order to gain more control over Libya. The United Nations, the European Union and the United States are at this moment preoccupied with the war between Ukraine and Russia and the war between Israel and Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran and the Houthi from Yemen.  It is likely that money and resources are not being deployed as much as could be possible in order to support the Government of National Accord. This situation gives countries like Russia, Egypt, the UAE or even Iran the time and space to get a good foothold on Libyan soil again after their departure in 2020.  It is highly unlikely that the UN will be able to make a case in the Security Council to act on sending more help and support to Libya in the coming months . If the October elections do not pass by freely or even end in violence, the UN will not be able to stop a third civil war from happening. If Libya devolves into civil war once more it will have repercussions for the North-African region and it could herald in a new era of instability for countries adjacent to Libya as a spill-over effect will be felt.  Refugees will flee Libya and will try to reach Algeria, Egypt and Tunisia. But with hundreds and thousands of refugees already fleeing wars in Sudan, Mali and other sub-saharan countries it will quickly turn into a humanitarian crisis.  The European Union will also have to deal with an increased flow of refugees coming from North-Africa. The very lucrative, and highly criticized, deals the EU has made with Libya, Tunisia and other countries to stem the flow of refugees will fall apart.  The EU now pays for its own border security by supporting the Libyan Navy to stop boats from crossing or to stop refugees from crossing into Libya through the deserts in the south. There is no guarantee that any warring faction will hold itself to the agreements reached with the EU if they are even still capable of performing their duties. Meanwhile, terrorist organizations like ISIS, Al Qaeda and others will undoubtedly reap the benefits of another civil war. Several organizations have been present in the country for decades and have used old smuggling routes and the willingness of local militias to do their dirty work for a handful of dollars. A renewed crisis in Libya will make it possible for terrorist organizations to grow their numbers and perhaps take possession of critical infrastructure like oil fields and airports in order to sustain their global networks. Conclusion Even though it is too early to tell, it seems that the rival factions in Libya have decided they need to solidify their tactical positions across the country before the elections in October 2024.  Both sides are antagonizing the other by mobilizing forces and asking militias, clans and mercenaries to join their side and strengthen their forces. Several armed clashes have already taken place in the capital of Tripoli between smaller rival factions, but it is likely that the major parties are looking to get the allegiance of as many militias as possible.  Airport, oil fields and harbors are in high demand by both parties as it will give them more control over how the successes of the oil production will be divided.  By trying to appoint a new president for the Central Bank, the Government of National Accord is willing to aggravate the situation to the dismay of the United Nations who is desperately trying to get the October elections going as smoothly as possible.  It is however to be seen if either party is willing to listen to outside voices calling for peace and unity while the cry for greed and lust for power seems a lot more appealing.

Date:   28/08/2024 Where : Balochistan (Pakistan) Who’s involved :  Separatist militants, Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA),  Pakistan’s government and security forces, the Inter-Service Intelligence forces (ISI) and China What happened? Between 25/08/2024 and 26/08/2024 several separate attacks targeting civilians coming from Pakistan’s Punjab province , took place in different cities in the Balochistan  (or Baluchistan) province, in the south-west of Pakistan. At least  74 people were killed , marking one of the deadliest days of violence in the province.  Civilians traveling from Punjab province were pulled from their vehicles and shot dead by armed gunmen. The deadliest of the attacks occurred in the Rarasham area of Musakhel district where at least 23 people were dragged out of their vehicles and were executed, after having verified their Punjabi ethnicity .  In Kalat district, 140 km South of the provincial capital Quetta,  armed fighters targeted law enforcement personnel , killing at least 10. Rail traffic was suspended in Bolan district, southeast of Quetta, on a rail linking the provincial capital to the rest of Pakistan, as well as on a rail link to neighboring Iran. Six people were killed.  The secessionist group Baloch Liberation Army (BLA)  claimed responsibility for the attacks. They said in a statement that the attacks targeted the security forces  and they took control of highways across the province.  Pakistani PM Shehbaz Sharif vowed retaliation for the brutal attacks and “complete elimination of terrorists” and stated that the separatists seek to disrupt the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Beijing,  which   has previously raised concerns about the security of its nationals working in Pakistan , condemned the attacks and offered support to Islamabad counter-terrorism efforts. The attacks occurred during a visit to Islamabad of Chinese top officials to discuss security of Chinese projects and infrastructure in Pakistan. Following militant attacks targeting foreign workers, the Pakistani government announced in June 2024 the creation of a special police unit to protect foreigners and bolster Chinese nationals' security  in the country.  The recent coordinated attacks are  not isolated incidents . Similar past attacks, targeting Punjabi laborers in Balochistan, have been claimed by the BLA. On 09/05/2024 seven barbers from Punjab province were   fatally shot in the port city of Gwadar, in Balochistan. In April 2024, 11 people were killed and several abducted in two separate attacks on the Quetta-Taftan highway.  During the past few months, massive large-scale peaceful protests by ethnic Baloch took place in Balochistan, to denounce systemic abuses by the central government to suppress political dissent , including extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. According to Amnesty International, over 10000 Baloch have disappeared since 2011. The government has been  violently cracking down on protests . Recent deadly clashes between protesters and security forces occurred in the vicinity of the port of Gwadar in late July 2024.  Analysis : Balochistan, bordering Afghanistan and Iran, is Pakistan’s largest but least populated province. It is predominantly inhabited by the Baluch minority,  ethnic group spread between Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran, which have fought against the Pakistani government since 2004. The Baloch insurgency is rooted in a combination of long-standing historical, economic and political grievances , including systematic political exclusion  and discrimination compared to the Punjab population, the majority ethnic group in Pakistan, unequal representation in institutions and law enforcement, and economic oppression and exploitation of the natural resources , especially natural gas.  While tensions between the central government and the Baloch minority are long-standing, the current separatist insurgency began with the announcement in 2001 of a   Chinese-funded project to build a mega-port  and transportation hub in the village of Gwadar. The local population though has neither been involved nor benefited from the construction of the infrastructure, run by the Pakistani government and relying on Chinese workers and engineers, spawning economic marginalization and resentment among the Baloch people.  Moreover, another factor in the violent escalation of the Baloch insurgency was the militarization of the region by Pakistani security forces  due to the influx of refugees and Taliban troops into the bordering region of Balochistan during the conflict in Afghanistan.  The Baloch Liberation Army is one of the main ethnic insurgent groups  in Balochistan. The group goal is the protection of Baloch people's economic and resource exploitation by the Pakistani state and the creation of an independent Baloch state. Authorities estimate the group to have around 3,000 fighters. It has been designated by the US as a terrorist organization. The BLA is based in bordering Afghanistan.  Insurgencies are also opposing the Pakistani government’s involvement in the Chinese Belt Road initiative,  accusing Islamabad of exploiting oil and mineral resources of Balochistan in the massive Chinese-led projects. In the past, Baloch groups have often targeted Chinese nationals and interests  in the province, including Gwadar port and mines.  While attacks on ethnic Punjab workers and foreigners have occurred before in Balochistan, the recent escalation of violence suggests a shift in scale, nature and coordination of BLA attacks and tactics . Punjabi civilians went from being casualties or sporadic targets  to the main target of greater coordinated brutality. The reasons behind the violent attacks appear to be mounting resentment over the economic exclusion of the local population over Punjabi majority and foreign workers. Moreover, an escalation of violence in the region would sabotage investment by foreign companies, especially Chinese,  exploiting local natural resources. Last year, on 07/04/2023,  the Pakistani intelligence agency, the ISI, revealed to the public it had arrested the leader of the Baloch National Army (BNA). The ISI then predicted that the insurgency movements in Balochistan had been dealt a severe blow and that the insurgents would surrender soon.  The ISI has since then continued to use force against Balochi people indiscriminately, further aggravating the local population. The government is expected to respond with a massive deployment of forces  in the already militarized Balochistan province. In order to stop attacks on civilians and preserve credibility with foreign partners and investors, especially China, an escalation of offensives against separatist groups is likely. More fighting is likely to further escalate the conflict .  Conclusion : While Baloch separatist groups' attacks targeting security personnel, civilians, and foreign workers are not new in Balochistan, the latest coordinated escalation of violence is especially alarming due to the  unprecedented scale and intensity . The attacks are the latest display of the frustration and grievances of the Baloch people , who denounce military oppression and political and economic exclusion by the Pakistani central government. Further protests are to be expected, although the brutality of the BLA's attacks might risk undermining the cause and claims of the Baloch ethnic movements.  The government will likely intensify its militarization efforts in the region, as it already has announced repercussions and has economic and diplomatic interests with China  in eradicating the separatist insurgency in Balochistan. Yet,  the military approach has been unsuccessful  in the past decades, instead exacerbating an escalation of the conflict between security forces and separatist armed groups. To solve the conflict, the Pakistani government should address the development and resource exploitation concerns of locals, ensure institutional recognition for the claims of the Baloch community, and end systematic discrimination. Unless serious measures are taken there is no chance of restoring stability and security and breaking the decades-long conflict in Balochistan .

Date:   21/08/2024 Who’s involved? Ukrainian government, Russian government, the Ukrainian Armed Forces, the Russian Armed Forces  What happened? Ukraine invaded Russian territory in the Kursk region on 06/08/2024 . This time multiple Ukrainian brigades were dedicated to the attack, as opposed to smaller contingents of Russian nationals seen in 2023 and early 2024 with groups such as the Freedom of Russia Legion and the Siberian brigade. Mass amounts of Russian POWs were taken, largely consisting of conscripted forces. This caused backlash in Russia, resulting in the first Russian initiated prisoner exchange talks. In the following days, airstrikes hit Russian air bases, which were suspected of housing the aircraft responsible for the mass glide-bomb attacks on Ukrainian lines. Most recently, Ukraine blew up three bridges, effectively cutting off 600km2 of land, and an estimated 3000 Russian troops from the rest of Russia. Russian forces have been unable to come up with a quick response to the Ukrainian incursion, losing large amounts of reinforcing troops to ambushes. However, Russian defenses seem to slowly be established by now.    What is Ukraine’s motivation? Diversion of Russian troops:  This goal is both short- and long-term. In the short-term, as a direct effect of this incursion, Russia will have to redirect troops from the active front lines in Ukraine to the Kursk region. This results in slightly less pressure on Ukrainian troops on those lines. In the longer-term, this incursion is likely to make Russia dedicate more troops to the defense of its own borders, locking these troops out of combat in Ukraine. If Russia opts to not do so, it runs the risk of falling to another incursion in the future. This balances the ‘field’ more, as Ukraine has had to protect all of its border shared with Russia, and even Belarus, since the start of the full-scale invasion in February 2022.  Denying Russia rest:  Russia has been on the offensive since March 2024. Offensive operations always cost more manpower, equipment, and ammunition than defensive operations. At the point of culmination, when an offensive has lost all of its momentum, an army typically takes a defensive posture to ‘recharge’. This moment will arrive soon for the Russian army, but they will likely not be able to rest, as it is unlikely that Putin will allow Ukraine to hold Russian territory for long. This means the Russian army will have to stay on the attack in the Kursk region, after being on the attack for months already. This will likely hurt their future war effort.  Bringing the war to Russia:  For the first time since the start of the full scale war, large swaths of Russian land, over 1000km2 has been occupied by Ukrainian forces. This forced Russian citizens to flee, and showed Russians living near Ukraine that they are not safe from this war. This (for now) massively successful Ukrainian incursion also showed the Russian citizens that Putin is not as in control of the situation as he outwardly portrays to be, hurting the stability of his position.  Diplomatic leverage:  If peace talks will happen, and Ukraine is still holding Russian territory, this ensures Kyiv leverage at the negotiating table. However, (for now) Ukraine’s official stance is that they do not plan to hold the Russian territory in the long-term.  Seize successes on the battlefield:  It has been a while since Ukraine had any major gains on the battlefield, dating as far back as late 2022. This new success does not only hurt Russian morale, but it is also likely to significantly boost Ukrainian morale. It is critical that Ukraine continues this operation successfully, and if/when pulling out of Russia, does not incur major losses of personnel or machines.  POW exchange fund:  Ukraine managed to capture record amounts of POWs in the two weeks (at the time of writing) of this operation. Reportedly, over 2000 Russian soldiers were captured. As declared by Zelensky, these POWs will be used to exchange captured Ukrainian soldiers. The Azov fighters captured at Mariupol are specifically mentioned. Due to both the scale and conscript nature of most of the POWs taken in Kursk, Russia is more inclined to exchange POWs to quell unrest in Russia itself.  Show to ‘the West’ Ukraine’s capabilities to win:  As mentioned before, the last Ukrainian victory on the frontlines was more than a year ago in 2022. One of the main reasons used by those who oppose supporting Ukraine in ‘the West’ is the claim that Ukraine does not have the capability to win the war. This incursion into Kursk shows Ukraine’s capabilities and potential. This may motivate Western leaders to donate more equipment to Ukraine.  Conclusion Ukraine’s operation into Kursk can be seen as a great success for Kyiv (at the time of writing). Multiple goals have been achieved, and there are no signs of the Ukrainian Armed Forces decreasing their efforts anytime soon. As they still hold the upper hand, and dictate the fighting, there is potential for further success. It will however be critical for Ukraine to not let this operation end with major losses while holding onto territory against mass attacks from Russia, if those will happen. This would take away from the success of this operation and severely damage Ukrainian morale.

Date:  20/08/2024  Where : Haiti Who’s involved : Kenya-led MSS,  Haiti security forces, gangs  What happened? Haiti has been experiencing a deteriorating security and humanitarian crisis since the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse in 2021.  In  September 2022, a powerful coalition of gangs, known as the G9 Family led by Jimmy “Barbecue” Cherizier, took control of several parts of the capital Port-au-Prince. The security situation further deteriorated in late February and March 2024 , when gangs launched a series of coordinated attacks in response to former de facto PM Ariel Henry’s agreement for the deployment of Kenyan police officers in the country. The escalation of violence and the unrest led to a political crisis, the resignation of the contested PM Henry, and the installation of a transitional council. Haiti's new government was announced in June 2024 , led by Prime Minister Garry Conille.  Amid   growing insecurity and gang-related violence in Haiti, the   UN Security Council approved to send a Kenyan-led multinational force , the Multinational Security Support (MSS), to assist the Haitian government in countering armed gang violence in October 2023. The MSS’ aim is primarily to train the Haiti National Police (PNH) to defeat the armed gangs and lead to a situation where it will be possible to hold democratic elections.   The initial forces of the MSS arrived in the country on 25/06/2024 , after several postponements. Currently, 400 of the 2500 planned forces have been deployed in Haiti. Along with Kenya, other countries, including the Bahamas, Bangladesh, Chad, Barbados, Jamaica and Benin, are planning to join the support mission.  Since their arrival,  Kenyan forces are not achieving significant results and advances against the gangs , which control 90% of the capital. The main accomplishment of the MSS has been taking back control of the largest public hospital in Haiti. Analysis : Haiti is grappling with a prolonged economic, political and security crisis . The crisis was exacerbated by the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse in 2021. The recent escalation of gang-related violence and political instability has worsened the already precarious situation. In Haiti there are more than half a million internally displaced people, about 5.5 million people in immediate need of humanitarian assistance, and about 45% of the population facing food insecurity. Kidnappings and murders have soared in recent months, with over 3,200 reported killings in 2024.  The MSS is widely regarded as a key response to Haiti's security issue, welcomed as a “unique opportunity” to restore order by Haiti’s interim PM Conille, and praised by US President Biden as “the best chance” to restore democratic governance in the country. However, the MSS has been presented with structural and mandate issues that make it unlikely to achieve its goals, and is spawning significant controversies.  First, the MSS’s mandate and long-term strategies are not clear and transparent.  Although authorized by the UN Security Council, the MSS mission operates outside the  supervision of the UN and involves limited involvement of Haitian authorities and civil society.  Haitian authorities, including the Presidential Security Council and law enforcements, appear to have limited influence and knowledge of the MSS mission's operational strategies.  The lack of cooperation between the government and the MSS   undermines the credibility and legitimacy of the mission.  The main objective of the MSS is to support and train Haiti’s national police (PNH) into tackling gang violence and assist the government in restoring law and order, addressing the humanitarian crisis and advancing the political process. However , little progress has been made for Haitian police capacity building . The risk is that the MSS mandate ends leaving the PNH untrained and in an unchanged unstable environment. Slow progress shows that the mission may lack adequate resources and equipment .  The MSS force lacks critical assets such as helicopters, combat vehicles, and necessary infrastructure, to combat the estimated 5,000 to 10,000 gang members entrenched in and around Port-au-Prince. The situation has increased pressure on the operation’s main sponsor, the US, to boost financial support and deploy additional resources . Beyond financial aid, the MSS also requires more personnel. Although additional forces were expected from countries like the Bahamas, Bangladesh, and Jamaica, their deployment remains uncertain.  Moreover, human rights organizations and Haitian civil society expressed concerns over the lack of clear accountability mechanisms to address potential human rights violations.   Haiti has a troubled history with international interventions and impunity. The last international intervention, the U.N.’s 2004-2017 MINUSTAH mission, resulted in a massive sexual abuse scandal and a cholera epidemic. MINUSTAH have caused widespread distrust of foreign forces in Haiti, and part of the civil society remains opposed toward international interventions . Moreover, Amnesty International has pointed to the Kenyan police’s troubling human rights record, including recent allegations of brutality towards protesters in Nairobi, last June 2024 .  Finally, the MSS lacks a long-term strategy to address and solve the root causes of the cycle of violence in Haiti . Besides the short-term goal of assisting and training the Haiti National Police (PNH) in fighting gangs, the MSS has a marked military-centric approach  which will prove ineffective in the long run in identifying and resolving the socio-economic and political drivers underlying the gang violence and dynamics in the country. Gangs in Haiti are deeply intertwined with society, the political sphere, and the private sector and cannot be eradicated by military force alone . Moreover, Haitian gangs are linked with regional criminal organizations and successfully finance their activities by participating in transnational illicit networks, mostly arms and drugs trafficking.  Kenya has recently experienced a big wave of anti-government protests  that lasted for over a month. Although not reported by the media, it is also possible that further  turmoil in Kenya might have an impact on the Kenyan forces deployed in Haiti,  perhaps requiring them to go back to provide support in their country.  Conclusion : Nearly two months after the arrival of the international MSS forces little has changed in the volatile security environment in Haiti.  Despite the deployment of international forces, the humanitarian crisis and escalating gang-related violence is intensifying.  The mission, greeted with great enthusiasm by the international community and the Haitian ad interim government, does not seem to be able to meet expectations due to discrepancies between the ambitious objectives and actual resources and the lack of a clear mandate.  The inconsistencies of the MSS and the lack of tangible improvements for the local population threaten to exacerbate frustrations and distrust toward local authorities and foreign forces , jeopardizing the credibility and legitimacy of the Kenyan-led mission. Moreover, ensuring the success of the MSS requires a long-term strategy to address gang violence  and governance with a more holistic approach. Capacity building of the Haitian police force and greater involvement and ownership of the country's stabilization process by the government and local stakeholders are imperative steps to accomplish the objectives of the MSS.